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Abstract 
Though politically disparate and hard to quantify, one of the binding elements of the Tea Party 
Movement is Internet Communication Technology, or new media.  Social media, online 
discussion boards, blogs, and other forms of new media constitute a veritable component of the 
discourse among its members.  From the whispering confederation of conservative bloggers in its 
beginning stages, to the relatively quick transition into a social media powerhouse, the Tea Party 
fits into the category of dissident social movements in a new way than movements past, in that 
web-based communication is a staple of the movement.  Also, the Tea Party‘s ―Web 2.0‖ identity 
intersects with a tradition of populism, combining new media communication with rhetoric 
depicting the Tea Party as ―common‖ people pitted against ―elitist‖ enemies of the country.  The 
populist sentiments within the Tea Party reflect a wider understanding about the role of 
technology in fostering democracy, and ―restoring‖ the republic back to its ―core values.‖  Tea 
Partiers, then, could be described as ―Digital Populists,‖ historically situated among the histories 
of other American populist moments, but understanding new media technology as a new way to 
shape political discourse.  Throughout this project, then, my aim is to link populist rhetoric with 
technological determinism, using the Tea Party‘s new media ecology as a case study.  The first 
chapter provides historical examples of populist rhetorical frameworks informing the relationship 
between technology and society; Chapter 2 is a case study of three Tea Party websites; and 
Chapter 3 is a theoretical reflection on the data that analyzes how the Tea Party‘s engagement 
with new media fits into broader conversations about technology and democracy.  At the core of 
this project is an inquiry into how technology works in our everyday lives.  My analysis 
questions the presumption that new media communication technology fosters a more democratic 
society.  Specifically, I argue that, while steeped in rhetoric of technological liberation, 
revolution, and democracy, the Tea Party‘s approach to new media contributes less to a vibrant 
culture of democratic engagement, and more to a peculiar and unstable technological mythology 
in American culture.  
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Introduction:  Issues of Technology and the Tea Party Movement 
The Tea Party Movement embodies a notable, yet puzzling force in American politics.  
For one, the political positions within the party vary widely among the spectrum of political 
ideologies, making it hard to categorize by anyone attempting to understand it.  The rhetoric out 
of the party can be calculated and focused at times, and provocative, controversial, and 
contradictory at others.  The Tea Party is difficult to pin down and hard to understand, but yet it 
nevertheless exhibits a tremendous influence on American politics, the news cycle, and society 
in general.  Ultimately, the Tea Party can be characterized as shared outrage at the Obama 
administration‘s financial policies as well as the healthcare reform acts of 2010.  But the Tea 
Party represents much more than that.  The strains of thought often compete with one another, 
and different factions align themselves with different goals, some using the Tea Party as a 
vehicle to elect certain officials, while others maintaining the movement is strictly ideological.  
Detractors call its members racist, nativist, conspiratorial, and even those who agree with their 
fiscal policies often don‘t know what to do with them.   
One of the binding elements of the Tea Party movement, though, is Internet 
Communication Technology, or new media.  Social media like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, 
or online discussion boards, blogs, and other forms of new media constitute a veritable 
component of the discourse among Tea Partiers.  From the whispering confederation of 
conservative bloggers in its beginning stages, to the relatively quick transition into a social media 
powerhouse, the Tea Party fits into the category of dissident social movements in a new way 
than movements past, in that web-based communication is a staple of the movement. 
2 
 
Also, the Tea Party‘s ―Web 2.0‖ identity intersects with a tradition of populism, 
combining new media communication with rhetoric depicting the Tea Party as ―common‖ people 
pitted against ―elitist‖ enemies of the country.  The populist sentiments within the Tea Party 
reflect a wider understanding about the role of technology in fostering democracy, and 
―restoring‖ the republic back to its ―core values.‖  Tea Partiers, then, could also be described as 
what I call ―Digital Populists,‖ historically situated among the histories of other American 
populist movements, but understanding new media technology as a new way to shape political 
discourse.  For instance, Ben McGrath of The New Yorker captures a telling portrait of how 
populist rhetoric intersects with a ―Web 2.0‖ identity.  Reporting from a Kentucky-based Tea 
Party rally in February of 2010, McGrath noted a man parading the event impersonating George 
Washington. ―I‘m back for the Second American Revolution,‖ he said.  Only, ―my weapons this 
time will be the Constitution, the Internet, and my talk-radio ads.‖
1
  The Tea Party‘s populist 
tendencies enable its members to understand technology both as a foundational organizational 
tool as well as a liberating weapon of democracy.   
Therefore I frame my questions around the intersections of populism, technology, and 
democracy:  How does the Tea Party take up, use, and talk about technology and how do their 
media engagement/narratives fit into a broader conversation about technology and democracy? 
Throughout this project, then, I propose that the Tea Party taps into a populist rhetorical 
framework to describe and make use of new media, which exposes the weakness of a 
―deterministic‖ understanding of technology while simultaneously revealing a deeper American 
myth that technology enhances a stronger, more ―effective‖ democracy. 
                                                          
1
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The United States has a peculiar history with regard to technological rhetoric, framing 
technology in terms of liberation, democracy, freedom, and revolution.  One does not need to 
travel far to see these connections.  Think about Apple commercials, the railroads, or the 2009 
Iranian election protests, which American journalists at one point dubbed ―The Twitter 
Revolution.‖  However, this project takes as its starting point philosophies of technology that 
reject these ―deterministic‖ narratives of how technology interacts with society, and instead puts 
forward a critique of internet-based communication technology and its relationship to democracy 
through an analysis of the Tea Party movement.  The temptation when writing about new media 
technology is to fall into the trap of writing about how technology affects a certain group, or how 
technology impacts the way we communicate.  This is what I mean by deterministic.  As 
Langdon Winner writes, technologies do not inherently have political properties: ―What matters 
is not technology itself, but the social or economic system in which it is embedded.‖
2
 
Deterministic narratives of how technology functions in society fail to address the fact that social 
and political processes create technology.  Rather than an autonomous agent that acts upon 
political groups, technology is a tool that groups themselves use in culturally and historically 
specific ways, which reflects less about how technology affects groups and more about how 
technology reflects political, social, and cultural demographics. Lelia Green writes that 
technology is never neutral: ―When technology is implicated in social processes,‖ she writes, 
―there is nothing neutral about society‖ either.
3
  Pierre Levy echoes this notion by highlighting 
that technology is not inherently good or bad, or even neutral.  Rather technology ―conditions or 
constrains, exposes or closes off, a range of possibilities.‖
4
 Technology is thus one component—
a context—tangled among a web of politics, culture, and government policy. Therefore, we 
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cannot understand how technology functions within society without understanding first who is 
using it, what institutions and backdrops they are products of, and how this manifests itself in 
their contemporary use of and attitudes toward technology. Thus the Tea Party is a valuable 
movement to study in terms of these questions.  A unique and divisive social movement, the Tea 
Party uses new media technology in politically specific ways for culturally specific reasons.   
Also, by ―new media,‖ I employ Mizuko Ito‘s notion of media ―ecologies.‖ Ito uses ―new 
media‖ to describe ―a media ecology where more traditional media such as books, television, and 
radio are intersecting with digital media, specifically interactive media and media for social 
communication.‖ Ito notes the difficulty in describing the media we are scrutinizing when we say 
―new‖ because the media that are ―new‖ in our historical moment are continually shifting.  
―Interactive, digital, virtual, online, social, networked, convergent, etc.‖ are categories that 
define new only at this contemporary moment.  In time these too will be subsumed by ―newer‖ 
new media. For now, though, I am examining what Ito calls a ―constellation of media changes, in 
a move toward more digital, networked, and interactive forms, which together define the horizon 
of the ―new.‖‘
5
 Ito describes ―ecologies‖ as a metaphor that emphasizes ―the characteristics of an 
overall technical, social, cultural, and place-based system, in which the components are not 
decomposable or separable.‖
6
  It is not just one platform over another that is valuable to study, 
but the overall engagement with new media embedded in social and historical contexts.  Ito‘s 
study applies ―media ecologies‖ to youth and teen culture, but the Tea Party‘s new media 
ecology suggests that teens are not the only ones using new media.  My analysis, like Ito‘s, 
focuses on ―group social interaction and engagement with shared cultural forms,‖ but with regard 
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to political movements.  ―Engagement with the media (itself a form of mediated sociability),‖ Ito 
writes, ―Is a constitutive part of how we learn to participate as culturally competent, social, and 
knowledgeable beings.‖ Therefore, the ways in which the Tea Party Movement takes up and 
engage with new media in the context of its social and historical perspective are important in 
extending Ito‘s analysis beyond the realm of youth participation in media ecologies to the media 
ecologies of other political and social movements.
7
 
Using the context of new media and media ecologies then, we see how the Tea Party‘s 
media ecology, which recognizes the cultural and historical contexts of engagement with 
technology, reveals three overlapping and intersecting currents of the Tea Party:  populism, 
technology, and democracy.  The three chapters that follow are an attempt to unpack these 
concepts, as this social movement is deeply embedded in a history of populism, technology, and 
democracy. Furthermore, through the brief case study of several Tea Party Websites in chapter 2, 
I want to propose new avenues of research on the relationship between technology and 
democracy.  I consider this project a qualitative rhetorical analysis relying heavily on theory and 
close textual readings of cultural productions.  Therefore this project uses historical, rhetorical 
and media analyses to gauge the relationship between technology, democracy, and social 
movements in our web 2.0 historical/cultural moment. 
Chapter 1 addresses the Tea Party‘s rhetorical relationship with American populist 
movements and technology.  The mostly conservative, white demographic of populist 
movements throughout history shows a pattern of a relationship with technology characterized as 
oppositional, alternative, or serving a common ―people‖ to whom traditional forms of 
communication are now unreliable.  The Tea Party of the 21
st
 century similarly understands the 
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Internet, utilizing ―Web 2.0‖ communication as a way to counteract the ―lame-stream media‖ 
and to disseminate its own information, championing an increased democratic exchange in which 
―freedom‖ and ―liberty‖ can now be reclaimed from an unscrupulous class of elites.  But 
understanding technology through this type of populist rhetorical frame is an unstable 
relationship at best.  The history of populism reveals more generally that who was included 
among the common ―people‖ was usually more exclusive than inclusive.  The Tea Party‘s 
relationship with new media communication technology is complex in that, much like populist 
movements of the past, the Tea Party‘s use of technology promotes ―democracy,‖ ―freedom,‖ 
and ―liberty,‖ while simultaneously fostering a radicalized social environment that defines itself 
more in terms of who is excluded rather than who is included; The ―we‖ in ―we the people‖ often 
tends to be smaller and more insulated than the Tea Party rhetoric would lead on, and this is 
reflected in the Tea Party‘s use of online communication technology.   
The Tea Party‘s use of online communication technology exposes its populist roots in the 
way it promotes democracy, freedom, and liberty while simultaneously restricting debate and 
closing off access to outsiders.  The Tea Party is connected to this rhetorical history of populist 
movements, and rhetoric of fighting for the rights of ―the common man‖ in opposition to 
―elitists‖ reveals itself markedly in the way the Tea Party uses and talks about new media.  While 
the Tea Party‘s digital genesis marks a new way of looking at political communication, the 
movement nevertheless functions within a larger historical context of other dissonant groups 
using technology to communicate.  The goal of this chapter is to argue for a rhetorical definition 
of populism, while simultaneously situating the Tea Party Movement more broadly in a historical 
context of reactionary ideology.  I argue that rhetoric of ―taking the country back,‖ and a 
rejection of popular modes of communication technology in favor of  a more ―democratic,‖ 
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alternative form of communication is a pattern in populist uprisings throughout American 
history.  I do this in part to note the ways in which the Tea Party fit into larger historical patterns, 
but also to show where the Tea Party forges new ways of understanding technology and 
citizenship.  Michael Kazin is a helpful guide in this respect.  Kazin‘s definition of populism is 
defined as a rhetorical mode rather than a prescriptive ideology, communicated through various 
types of technological platforms.  To Kazin, ―populism‖ is not an ideology but an ―impulse,‖ a 
―flexible mode of persuasion‖:  
Whether orated, written, drawn, broadcast, or televised, this language is used by those 
who claim to speak for the vast majority of Americans who work hard and love their 
country.  That is the most basic and telling definition of populism:  a language whose 
speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble assemblage not bounded narrowly by 
class, view their elite opponents as self-serving and undemocratic, and seek to mobilize 
the former against the latter .
8
 
 
The rhetoric of reclamation, common now among Tea Party websites, blogs, and general 
proponents, is comparable to many populist moments in American history, both liberal and 
conservative.  In particular, though, I focus on the influence of conservative, reactionary populist 
movements and the unique attributes of their relationship with technology that correlate with the 
Tea Party Movement of today.   
Chapter 2 is a brief history of the Tea Party, focusing primarily on three important Tea 
Party websites, Tea Party Patriots, Tea Party Express, and Freedomworks.  This analysis looks 
at the histories, mission statements, videos, training sessions, blog posts, and other forms of 
digital political rhetoric to explore the populist rhetorical patterns from Chapter 1.  By utilizing a 
close reading of these websites, I hope to capture the online element of how Tea Partiers see new 
media as an opportunity to express an anti-elitist desire to ―reclaim‖ America and ―return‖ to 
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core values of ―democracy‖ and ―freedom.‖  Thinking about this methodologically, Kazin also is 
helpful.  In Populist Persuasion, his methodology straddles two notions: the power of rhetoric in 
constructing the public sphere and the materiality of that social world.  In other words, ―the 
social world of language users and the types of expression they employed.‖ Kazin writes, 
―Political discourse does not speak itself; it is the creation of people engaged in institutions with 
varied resources and agendas.” Combining these two methodological principles, Kazin writes 
what he calls ―linguistically informed history,‖ including the contributions a variety of people 
and institutions as sources:  ―parties, unions, voluntary associations, universities, the state, media 
institutions—from the Jacksonian penny press to cable television.‖
9
   
In this way I extend Kazin‘s claim that people with varied institutional backgrounds and 
agendas use technological platforms to create political discourse. Therefore, understanding who 
is using technology, what institutions they are products of, and how they came to appropriate 
technology to spread their populist messages are important components to unpacking the 
relationship among populism, technology and democracy.  The group in-fighting and major 
disagreements within the Tea Party groups, the influence of the media, populist rhetorical 
narratives in Tea Party online content, all indicate that the comparison with progress and new 
technology is a fleeting and unstable relationship.  I argue that through a ―linguistically informed 
history‖ of these three Tea Party websites, we see more clearly the American myth that 
technology is a freedom-granting, liberating weapon of democracy, when actually new media 
technology can open and close doors, depending on resources, capital, agendas, and politics. 
Chapter 3 is a theoretical reflection on the data that analyzes how the Tea Party's 
engagement with new media fits into broader conversations about technology and democracy.  
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Moreover, this relationship suggests a need for further research into the relationship between the 
Internet and democracy.  For instance, many previous studies focus on progressive social 
movements and their use of new media technology to fight corporate power, democratize 
information, or to critique hegemonic society.  But the Tea Party, a conservative, some might 
call radical political movement, offers a different perspective on traditional understandings about 
the relationship between technology and democracy.  Born out of what some may call a ―digital 
genesis,‖ the Tea Party relies on new media to communicate, recruit and train potential activists, 
disseminate information, and organize one another.  But they also use technology to stifle debate, 
promote exclusive, often nativist philosophies of hyper individualism and political propaganda, 
which seemingly contradicts notions that new media aids democratic exchange, combats tyranny, 
and facilitates civic engagement.   
Indeed, much of the scholarship on technology and democracy involves notions of the 
―public sphere,‖ which is a metaphor for the space within which debate and public opinion are 
formed, where ideas flow freely, access is open, and civic engagement occurs.  In this chapter I 
cover the unstable relationship between online communication and what can be referred to as 
―the public sphere,‖ and how the Tea Party‘s fundamental use of new media complicates 
traditional technological narratives about the Internet and democracy.  The Tea Party‘s use of 
technology, I argue, exposes how communication technologies are both a potential tool for 
fostering a democratic civil society, as others have aptly brought up, and as a potential for 
extremist camps on any side of the political fence to gain unprecedented access and influence in 
the public sphere.  This in turn exposes the unstable and contested legitimacy of new media with 
regard to the public sphere entirely.  I argue that the online presence of a right-wing populist 
political and social movement like the Tea Party complicates scholarship on the Internet and 
10 
 
democracy in that a crucial element of a successful democracy, a public sphere based on critical 
rational debate, is compromised by a stifling and exclusive radical presence, despite its 
widespread publicity.  Moreover, group use of technology to place ideas into a larger discursive 
space can sometimes create ―digital islands‖ of communication, which may suppress counter-
narratives of those without digital access, resulting in the stifling of democracy.   
Part of this analysis draws from definitions of ―public culture,‖ which help show that the 
Tea Party‘s engagement with new media is linked to its participation in the public sphere. 
Appadurai and Breckenridge describe ―public culture‖ as ―a set of arenas that have emerged in a 
variety of historical conditions and that articulate the space between domestic life and the 
projects of the nation state—where different social groups (classes, ethnic groups, genders) 
constitute their identities by their experience of mass mediated forms in relation to the practices 
of everyday life.‖
10
 In other words, public culture, as it is experienced by the Tea Party, is 
situated between ―commercial media environments‖ and the nation state.
11
 This unique 
relationship between mass media and online communication is what Henry Jenkins calls 
―Convergence,‖ and reveals new ways of conceptualizing technology and democracy.  While 
there are many ―techno-utopians‖ who theorize that new media and convergence culture are the 
signal of a re-flourishing of a viable democracy, I argue that in the Tea Party‘s case, this is not 
necessarily true.  As Henry Jenkins notes, ―Too often, there is a tendency to read all grassroots 
media as somehow ―resistant‖ to dominant institutions rather than acknowledging that citizens 
sometimes deploy bottom-up means to keep others down.‖  The Tea Party, a self-purported 
grassroots movement utilizing a presupposed democratic technology of the Internet, defines itself 
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in these terms and as a minority of ―true‖ participants in the public sphere.  But as we will see, 
demographically, politically, and rhetorically, the Tea Party‘s relationship with the ―marketplace 
of ideas‖ is fleeting and unstable at best.  Again, Jenkins warns, ―Too often, we have sought to 
deflect criticism of grassroots culture rather than trying to identify and resolve conflicts and 
contradictions which might prevent it from achieving its full potentials.‖
 12
   
Obviously, however, the model of the public sphere is limiting, and for good reason.  As 
Zizi Paparachissi writes on her analysis of the public sphere, ―the public sphere is not proposed 
as the ideal model for understanding the political significance of the Internet.  Since the 
beginning of democracy, individuals have strived to convene politically within the locus of a 
public sphere with more or less success.  Thus, this is used as a model that allows us to organize, 
characterize, and evaluate the merit of civic uses of the Internet.‖  In other words, Habermas‘s 
public sphere is not an essentialized reality into which the Tea Party fits nicely.  Rather, as 
Papacharissi writes, the public sphere is ―a theoretical model that allows us to discuss the civic 
gravitas of the Internet, contextualize it within the contemporary socio-economic setting, and 
compare it to that of other media.‖
13
 Through an analysis of the public sphere, as it was first 
introduced by Jurgen Habermas, and through the series of critiques that followed, including 
notions of counter-publics, alternative publics, and public culture, I place the Tea Party‘s media 
engagement among these conversations to heed Jenkins warning and show a possibility for 
further research into the relationship between social movements, convergence culture, and 
democracy. 
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At the core of this project, then, is an inquiry into how technology works in our everyday 
lives.  My analysis questions the presumption that new media technology does indeed foster a 
more democratic society.  Specifically, I look at the new media practices of the Tea Party 
movement to gauge how its use of and rhetoric about technology fit into a specific rhetorical 
legacy as well as broader conversations about the relationship between technology and 
democracy.  Understanding this relationship is important.  Andrew Feenberg notes that the 
tangled relationship between democracy and the Internet is related to the meaning of modernity 
itself,
14
 and Pierre Levy similarly notes the importance in distinguishing technology‘s place in 
society: ―It is a question not of evaluating its ―impact‖ but of identifying those points of 
irreversibility where technology forces us to commit ourselves and provides us with 
opportunities, of formulating the projects that will exploit the virtualities it bears within it and 
deciding what we will make of them.‖ Like Levy, I hope to draw attention to the potentials of 
cyberculture as both a prospective poison and a remedy; the onus is on society to make valuable 
use of it.
 15
 
 
The Tea Party is a suitable lens through which to view these questions because of its 
distinct narrative about the democratic and liberating uses of technology.  In addition, the Tea 
Party‘s populist lineage provides a rhetorical framework that enables its supporters to view 
technology in this way.  Through the study of the Tea Party and its various uses of new media, 
we see an unstable relationship with populism, technology and democracy.  
The implications of the instability of technology and democracy are not just academic—
but speak to a core believe in America that there is something inherently democratic about 
technology, and moreover that a populist rhetorical frame pervades national conversations about 
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technology and innovation in general. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‘s recent speech on 
―internet freedom‖ echoes this sentiment.  Drawing from populist narratives about the 
relationship between innovation, knowledge and democracy, Clinton stated that the United States 
stands for a ―single internet where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and ideas.‖  
Interestingly enough, this statement comes at a time when ―Wikileaks,‖ an organization 
notorious for releasing classified American intelligence, had its account (and ability to raise 
money) frozen by the American companies PayPal and MasterCard.  This begs the question, 
what kind of equal access to knowledge do we mean? What kind of democracy are we trying to 
promote?  In this case study, I look at the new media practices of the Tea Party movement to 
gauge how its use of and rhetoric about technology fit into this conversation.  This brief study 
into the Tea Party‘s new media practices offers a new perspective that will expand understanding 
of how social groups use and talk about technology in contributing to a democratic society.  
To be sure, though, new media and internet communication technology say yes to many 
things.  The way political groups challenge power by organizing and connecting to one another 
through new media is important to study.  But technology can also say no. Governments can use 
new media to increase surveillance, produce propaganda, or subdue populations.
16
 While the Tea 
Party is no authoritarian regime, my project shows the limits of new media with regard to 
democracy, and that just because new media makes organization more effective does not 
necessarily foster a livelier public sphere and more robust democratic engagement.  By 
approaching the Tea Party in terms of the aforementioned overlapping relationships with 
populism, technology, and democracy, I use a methodological pretext that Michael Kazin has 
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called ―linguistically informed history,‖ to show how the Tea Party, while steeped in rhetoric of 
technological liberation, revolution, and democracy, contributes less to a more vibrant 
democracy, and more to a peculiar and unstable technological mythology in American history 
and politics.
15 
 
Chapter 1:  Populist Rhetorical Frames and Technological Dispositions 
When famous depression-era radio priest Father Coughlin broadcast his sermons on the 
radio, defending the aspirations of the ―common people‖ and chastising the pervasive influence 
of communism, in addition to advocating a particular ideology, he was also taking advantage of a 
political style of communication, a linguistic mode of persuasion.  When the People‘s Party 
circulated alternative newspapers, when Ross Perot took advantage of cable news to advertise his 
campaign for presidency, or when Sara Palin chastises the ―lamestream media‖ in praise of the 
Tea Party Movement—these politicians were using the rhetoric of populism to advocate not only 
their political platform, but also for a particular relationship with communication technology.  
While it is not my position that populism functions as a coherent ideology throughout each of 
these diverse political moments, I do argue that populism is a sustained rhetorical pattern that 
shows up in each of these movements, particularly in the way they regard technology, but also in 
the way they pit themselves and their constituents as virtuous ―people‖ against their detractors, 
who function as villainous ―enemies‖ who are out to subvert and maliciously destroy a virtuous 
way of life.  Moreover, I argue that these populist rhetorical frameworks also inform the 
relationship between social groups and technology—depicting technology as a way to oust elite 
―eggheads‖ or circumvent unreliable ―mainstream‖ media in favor of more democratic means of 
communication.   
The first part of this chapter discusses the multiple, competing, and often overlapping 
definitions of "populism.‖  Then, through a discussion of the various approaches to populism 
scholarship, couched in various examples, including the People‘s Party, Father Coughlin, Ross 
Perot, and the Tea Party Movement, I argue that there is a distinct relationship between populism 
16 
 
and technology that indicates sustained patterns as much as it does dynamic and complex 
differences.  
The Tea Partiers represent strains of what the scholars, the media, and critics often refer 
to as ―populist‖ in that the group maintains that their cause and their motives benefit ―the people‖ 
over elites.  Ron Formissano, in an effort to define populism in manageable terms, first noted this 
difficulty in studying populism ―because populist movements usually tend to be amalgams of 
contradictory tendencies.‖
1
  Indeed, populist rhetoric has been a staple of American politics since 
the founding of the United States, from Thomas Paine‘s influential pamphlet ―Common Sense‖ 
to Rousseau‘s advocacy of direct democracy.  Michael P. Federici called people like Pain and 
Rousseau ―plebiscitary democrats‖ in their impulse toward the popular will, which ―should be 
uninhibited by institutional or cultural checks.‖
2
  But the meaning of populism has taken many 
different forms throughout American history, for Paine‘s use of populism (the term wasn‘t even 
used in his lifetime) differs very differently from Thomas Jefferson‘s.  Nevertheless the impulse 
toward populism came to bear through the Jeffersonians and the Jacksonians, and again in the 
Populist Party (capital P) in the late 19
th
 century.  At those points, more or less, populism was a 
political style used by progressive reformers and their movements for social justice. The rise of 
conservative populism can be contributed to the rise of the Conservative party in the United 
States, which takes a distinct turn in the period following WWII.  It was not until World War II 
that more conservative politicians began to appropriate populist rhetoric in a form of ―right-wing 
populism.‖
3
 As Peter Schweizer and Wynton C. Hall note, their study begins in the post-war 
period because it is only after 1945 that conservatism began to represent for once a ―unifying 
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current.‖  Quoting George Nash, Schweizer and Hall note that before 1945 there was no strong 
conservative voice in the country.  But ―gradually during the first postwar decade these voices 
multiplied, acquired an audience, and began to generate an intellectual movement.‖
4
  
Michael Kazin, however, defines populism as form of rhetoric, a ―flexible mode of 
persuasion‖ communicated through various technological modes:  ―Whether orated, written, 
drawn, broadcast, or televised,‖ Kazin writes, populism functions as a ―language‖ that is ―used 
by those who claim to speak for the vast majority of Americans who work hard and love their 
country.‖  Moreover, Kazin writes, ―That is the most basic and telling definition of populism:  a 
language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble assemblage not bounded 
narrowly by class, view their elite opponents as self serving and undemocratic, and seek to 
mobilize the former against the latter.‖
5
 Populism, Kazin notes, is a type of utopic ―rhetorical 
optimism‖ that questions class inequalities without calling the entire system into question, avoids 
racial imagery, even though populism is usually shaped in the image of white working class men, 
and appeals to a broad consortium of ―Americans‖ and ―simple people‖ whose values are being 
challenged and undermined by the powers that be.  In this sense, Kazin describes populism as a 
force that ―binds even as it divides.‖
6
 Taken as a rhetorical mode rather than an ideology, Kazin 
understands populism as ―an impulse‖ bound by particular rhetorical patterns, flexible, elastic, 
malleable, a product of historical forces that shape its meaning and importance: populism 
functions thus ―as a persistent yet mutable style of political rhetoric.‖
7
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Contrary to Michael Kazin‘s interpretation of populism, as a language and an impulse 
toward persuasion, Formissano instead seeks to understand populism as social movements, since, 
as he writes, including ―pretenders and free riders‖ in your definition of populism is difficult and 
counterproductive. Therefore, Formissano suggests mapping out the attributes of various populist 
social movements in the United Sates within a spectrum of what he calls progressive movements 
and reactionary movements.  Progressive populists, Formissano contends, are grassroots 
movements distrustful of ―conventional politics,‖ capitalizing on a base of ―ordinary people,‖ but 
―not necessarily anti-institutional‖ in belief; rather progressive populists are reacting against 
what they consider unfair and imbalanced political institutions. Progressive populists seek to 
regain control of their lives, which they see as lost or fleeting.  For example, Formissano 
highlights the People‘s Party, which ―wanted to restore the traditional independence of farmers 
through the novel means of the sub-treasury plan.‖
8
 
Reactionary populist movements, on the other hand, project a more ―masculine,‖ or 
―macho appeal,‖ resulting in a disproportionate number of male support than female.  Despite 
how reactionary populist movements at times place women into the public sphere of their 
discourse, it is nevertheless ―under cover of traditional gender ideology and accompanied by 
antifeminist protestations.‖  For example, Formissano highlights ―nativist women of the 1850s 
who supported the anti-Catholic Know-Nothing movement or the women auxiliaries of the 
second Klan.‖  Moreover, reactionary populism usually expresses cultural intolerance, hostility 
toward ―others,‖ the scapegoating of vulnerable groups and racial intolerance, as well as 
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controversial communication methods, like ―denying opponents the ability to assemble or speak 
or by engaging in harsher persecutions or silencing through violence.
9
 
Formissano‘s contextualization of populism as a spectrum of ideologies competes with 
Kazin‘s notion of populism as a rhetorical mode. But the two definitions also complement each 
other in some respects, as populism as a rhetorical device can be understood better if taken as a 
spectrum of ideological dispositions—in other words, a social movement dynamic comprised of 
competing rhetorics. Also, it seems that despite the difference in opinion, Kazin and Formissano 
agree on some level that populism represents some kind of blueprint for political engagement and 
rhetorical structure, though who is included in the blueprint may differ. 
Michael J. Lee attempts to bridge this gap, writing that populism is indeed a dynamic and 
complex rhetorical system, often competing with other populist rhetorics, changing in its focus 
and content like a chameleon, but nevertheless containing a cohesive ―argumentative frame‖ that 
―positions a virtuous ―people‖ against a powerful enemy and expresses disdain toward traditional 
forms of democratic deliberation and republican representation‖
10
 Lee writes that Kazin‘s 
characterization of populism as a language that pits the common man versus the elite is 
incomplete in ―addressing the complex interactions between the ―people‖ and their enemy in the 
construction of populist identity.‖
11
  Lee therefore highlights four interrelated rhetorical forms: 
―Populism,‖ he writes, ―begins with 1) the constitution of a virtuous ―people,‖ then 2) envisions 
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a robust ―enemy,‖ 3) decries the current ―system,‖ and finally 4) finds the promise of reform in 
―apocalyptic confrontation‖‖
12
 
First, populists and rhetoricians define the ―people‖ or the ―common man‖ in terms of a 
―collective force which transcends both individuality and reason.‖
13
  Second, crucial in defining 
the people is the concept of the enemy against which the people position themselves.  For 
instance, Lee notes Stuart Hall, who wrote how identity is structured in direct relation to an 
enemy: ―[Identity] has to go through the eye of the needle of the other before it can construct 
itself.‖
14
  Boyte explains populism in terms of the negative as well: ―The conviction that an elite 
has dishonored a historically, culturally, or geographically constituted people, its memories, 
origins, common territory, ways of life.‖
15
  The ―people‖ are pitted against an enemy committed 
to ―hoarding power‖ and destroying ―traditional values,‖—values like ―simple,‖ ―honest‖ or 
―ordinary‖ provide an ―interior referent‖ to constitute their identity, but the constitution of an 
enemy is a ―stabilizing exterior referent.‖
16
 Third, the traditional values subverted by the enemy 
represent a fear of the corruption of the ―system.‖  The sites along which power is distributed are 
in danger of being unseated, and a system that at one point represented justice, freedom, and 
liberty, is in danger of being dishonored, and worse, toppled entirely.  And finally the fourth 
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frame, as Lee describes, is thus an ―apocalyptic confrontation as the vehicle to revolutionary 
change.‖
17
   
For example, the 1892 People‘s Party Convention featured the keynote speaker, Ignatius 
Donnelly, an important political figure whom both Kazin and Lee mention, who gave a lengthy 
indictment of the present system in favor of a more celebrated democratic past which celebrated 
the Founders, guising the current agenda in the ―glorious‖ vision of the constitution.  ―Corruption 
dominates the ballot box, the Legislatures, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the 
bench,‖ he writes.  ―The people are demoralized…the newspapers are subsidized or muzzled, 
public opinion silenced, business prostrated.‖  Donnelly distinguishes between the elites and the 
common man, linking ―governmental injustice‖ to ―the two great classes—paupers and 
millionaires.‖  Moreover, these inequalities are the product of ―a vast conspiracy against 
mankind‖ that ―has been organized on two continents and is rapidly taking possession of the 
world.  If not met and overthrown at once it forbodes terrible social convulsions, the destruction 
of civilization or the establishment of an absolute despotism.‖
18
 This speech to the People‘s Party 
convention in Omaha in 1892 utilizes the construction of a people, defining an enemy, suspicion 
of a corrupt system, and finally, and most markedly, is the warning of an apocalyptic showdown 
if the traditional values are not restored.  Lee calls this rhetorical frame ―restorationism‖: 
Put clearly, ―restorationism‖ is the rhetorical production of historical simplicity.  The 
revolutionary era in this regard is not a series of contingent choices, vigorous debate, and 
consequential errors; rather, the populist argumentative frame harkens back to a simpler 
period when the political stars had aligned to reveal unmistakably just principles. Hence, 
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populists become systemic revolutionaries battling present perversions on behalf of past 
principles.
19
 
Through the case studies of the People‘s Party, Huey Long, and George Wallace, Lee 
concludes that through its four rhetorical tropes, ―populism, as a chameleonic political discourse, 
is a pattern of argument reverberating through U.S. history‖ and that ―populists of all political 
stripes have used this language to disparage the shielding of concentrated power in the space 
between citizens and their government,‖ which ―explains why radical political reformers of both 
the left and the right have found it a congenial language with which to challenge the status quo.‖  
This all demonstrates the ―shared political skepticism and uncompromising style of otherwise 
dissimilar rhetorics.‖
20
 
By considering the various and competing definitions of populism, Kazin and Lee are 
helpful in their conceptualization of populism as a rhetorical form.  And while Formissano 
disagrees with Kazin in what he considers a rather large rhetorical leap, Formissano nevertheless 
presents a valuable framework for categorizing various types of populist rhetoric in terms of 
progressive and conservative, which does not necessarily deviate from the rhetorical definition.  
While the messages and methods may differ, a similar rhetorical framework to which Kazin and 
Lee allude, is at work in populist moments, constructing a common people against an elite other, 
where the entire balance of freedom and liberty is in the fray.  Moreover, part of my argument 
here is also technological.  I would like to add to the scholarly conversation to argue that in 
addition to the populist rhetorical frameworks, various populist movements and groups also 
favored particular means of communication over others because of the perceived more 
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―common‖ forms.  For instance, in the aforementioned speech by Donnelly, notice the 
importance he put on the role of communication technology, the newspapers in his speech, 
describing the voice of the people being ―muzzled‖ by corporate elitists, arguing for public 
ownership of the newspaper as part of their political ideology. Understanding technology as a 
tool for democracy, either for conquering a primitive frontier, reaching out more easily to the 
―common man,‖ or owning the very means to the way the ―simple folk‖ can communicate—are 
patterns in populist groups particularly, and in America in general. 
However, when analyzing political rhetoric, it is important to understand it not in terms 
of equating one historical moment to another, or to say ―their moment is this moment,‖ a view 
Jill Lapore describes as ―antihistory.‖
21
 Rather, I intend on noting patterns and investigating 
these relationships to understand how a sustained narrative about technology is informed by 
populist rhetoric. In retreating from antihistory, though, there is danger in succumbing to an 
ideology that discredits your objects of inquiry politically—unfairly pathologizing something 
you disagree with.  For instance, in his famous 1964 essay, Richard Hofstadter coined the term 
―Paranoid Style‖ to describe ―the feeling of persecution‖ and ―grandiose theories of conspiracy‖ 
characteristic of right wing political thought.  Distinguishing between the clinical and political 
use of the term, Hofstadter noted that the clinically paranoid perceive conspiracies directed 
toward the individual, while ―the spokesman of the paranoid style finds it directed against a 
nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate affects not himself alone but millions of others.‖ 
Moreover, the paranoid style practitioner views his passions with a heightened sense of 
patriotism, righteousness, and ―moral indignation.‖
22
 Hofstadter implied that certain types of 
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political rhetoric align with mental pathology—as evidenced by historical theories of conspiracy 
dating back to late 19
th
 century Populist Party sentiments and the anti-Catholic and Masonic 
movements of the 1820s and 1830s.  
In current right-wing thought (―current‖ meaning the political climate of the 1960s, the 
time period in which Hofstadter was writing), Hofstadter noted the effects of mass media which 
renders ―the villains of the modern right…much more vivid than those of their paranoid 
predecessors.‖  Referencing the John Birch Society and McCarthyism, Hofstadter suggested that 
contemporary right-wing paranoid politics, then, exhibits a sense of America as being 
―dispossessed‖ and ―eaten away‖ by ―cosmopolitans and intellectuals.‖
23
 Perceiving our current 
political environment as a fundamental battle between good and evil, Hofstadter concludes, the 
paranoid suffers doubly from history since he is ―afflicted not only by the real world, with the 
rest of us, but by his fantasies as well.‖
24
  
It is easy to make connections between Hofstadter‘s paranoid style and the rhetoric of the 
Tea Party Movement, which perceives, in some form or another, a hostile takeover of American 
culture and way of life.  Indeed, many journalists invoke Hofstadter in the critique of people like 
Sarah Palin, Glenn Beck, and other Tea Party sympathizers.  One journalist proclaims,  
Conspiracy-mindedness isn't just for fringe political groups anymore; it makes for 
riveting entertainment. And it is all around us today, a disorder with an entire industry to 
act as its enabler.  The source for much of the current epidemic of paranoia is no doubt 
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the "Glenn Beck Show" on Fox News, which follows the Hofstadter script with 
remarkable faithfulness.
25
   
Hofstadter did mention the exacerbating effects of mass media on the projected demons of the 
right, and the comparison is not necessarily inappropriate. Another journalist, for instance, 
evokes Hofstadter again with regard to current conspiracy theories about President Barack 
Obama and ardent gun-control activists:  The Paranoid Style is ―alive and frothing,‖ The 
Economist writes. And ―Not much has changed since Richard Hofstadter described [The 
Paranoid Style]; Gun-lovers still argue that the slightest curb on their right to bear arms will 
make America vulnerable to tyranny.‖
26
 However, perhaps it is important to broaden the scope of 
the Tea Party, further back than Hofstadter‘s famous essay, in order to obtain a more nuanced 
understanding of politics, culture, and American right-wing reactionary populism. 
For instance, Gordon Wood, noting Hofstadter‘s influence on American psychohistory, 
details how the paranoid style came to vastly influence more psychological interpretations of the 
American Revolution.  After Hofstadter‘s famous essay, Wood writes, ―[The word] ―Paranoia‖ 
soon proliferated in historical writings on the Revolution.‖  Psychology was thus given a 
heightened significance and presumed ―a close connection between paranoid thinking and 
particular psychic sensibilities‖ of early American revolutionary thought.
27
  However, Wood 
urges historians to take a deep a breath.  ―How much further can we go?‖ he asks.  ―Maybe it is 
time to pause in our psychological explorations, step back, and get a quite different, wider 
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perspective on this mode of thinking.‖
28
 Wood urges that in order to understand how 
―reasonable‖ people came to believe in vast, dubious conspiracies, it is important to ―suspend our 
modern understanding about how events ought to be explained and open ourselves to that 
different world.‖ Wood traces how plots and conspiracies shifted in meaning from antiquity to 
the Enlightenment era, as the conceptions and worldviews of individuals began to transform and 
broaden.  As the political world became more complex, Wood writes,  
Conspiratorial interpretations—attributing events to the concerted designs of willful 
individuals—became a major means by which educated men in the early modern period 
ordered and gave meaning to their political world.  Far from being symptomatic of 
irrationality, this conspiratorial mode of explanation represented an enlightened stage in 
Western man‘s long struggle to comprehend his social reality.  It flowed from the 
scientific promise of the enlightenment and represented an effort, perhaps in retrospect a 
last desperate effort, to hold men personally and morally responsible for their actions. 
Wood attributes the Scientific Revolution for taking some of the mystery out of the world, 
issuing a ―mechanistic cause and effect in which what happens does so only because something 
else happened before.‖  Therefore, ―what was fundamental is that American secular thought—in 
fact, all enlightened thought of the 18
th
 century—was structured in such a way that conspiratorial 
explanations of complex events became normal, necessary, and rational.‖
29
  In conclusion, Wood 
argues that descriptions of people and movements as ―paranoid‖ and ―irrational‖ unfairly 
pathologizes political characteristics: ―Living in this complicated modern world, where the very 
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notion of causality is in doubt, should not prevent us from seeing that at another time and in 
another culture most enlightened people accounted for events in just this particular way.‖
30
 
Wood deviates from Hofstadter in considering conspiratorial belief some kind of mental 
aberration in American politics.  Indeed, Hofstadter was correct to highlight patterns in 
contemporary right-wing conspiratorial thinking, from the ―sustained conspiracy‖ of FDR‘s New 
Deal to the proliferation of socialism and communism.
31
  However, Wood is careful to attribute 
historical specificity to the American Revolutionaries in particular to highlight how in a general 
sense, the paranoid style was a rational and logical behavior of enlightened people.  That is not to 
say that Wood may not have taken issue with McCarthyism and the Bircher Society.  However, 
Wood is deliberate in his analysis to take the Revolutionaries seriously, on their own terms, 
viewing their actions not as mental defects, as far as modern post-industrial behaviorism is 
concerned, but as a mode of thought characteristic of a particular cultural moment. 
Thinking back to the commitment to retreating from Lapore‘s notion of ―antihistory,‖ it is 
worth noting Lapore‘s criticism of the ―presentism‖ of the Tea Party movement, and her 
invocation and admiration of Hofstadter as the one of the most fervent, if not ―bleakest,‖ of 
historians challenging right-wing political narratives of history.  Gordon Wood, interestingly 
enough, has criticized Lapore‘s take on the Tea Party for much of the same reasons he criticized 
Hofstadter‘s position on right-wing politics in the 1960s.  ―Sometimes her zeal to criticize the 
―antihistory‖ of the Tea Partiers carries her a bit too far,‖ Wood writes about Lapore.  Wood 
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criticizes Lapore for not taking the Tea Partiers seriously, on their own terms, and for criticizing 
the Tea Party for being silly, uneducated, and fundamentalists--and nothing more.
32
 
When considering the Tea Party‘s ideological perspective, it is important, then, to 
understand both Lapore‘s warning of the dangers of ―presentism‖ and ―antihistory,‖ and 
Hofstadter‘s analysis of a particular ―paranoid style,‖ all the while tempered by Wood‘s analysis 
of the Revolution.  Dismissing the Tea Party as ―paranoid‖ in a pejorative sense may in fact rob 
the Tea Party of historical particularity as well as how they are in some ways connected to a 
strain of political thought that historically made sense of the world around them in terms familiar 
to them.  For instance, in his analysis of the presidential campaigns of Jessie Jackson and Pat 
Robertson, Allen Hertzke rejects the pejorative interpretation of the Populist tradition that 
portrays their depictions as nativist demagogues a la Hofstadter.  ―The populists of the late 
nineteenth century,‖ he writes, ―now seem prescient in their appreciation of the economic 
consequences of the emerging industrial order…even if populist uprisings cannot ―govern,‖ they 
may be viewed as a societal gauge, registering pressures that build up whenever the 
commonwealth fails to negotiate the challenges of the times.  One does not have to agree with 
populist prescriptions, or approve of their attacks on elites, to sympathize with their disquiet.‖
33
 
Hertzke‘s investigation of populism as a ―societal gauge‖ is notable in its methodological goal to 
take populism seriously, while not aligning politically to their causes nor dismissing their 
interpretation of events as uneducated or without merit. 
Alfred Kazin also writes in On Native Grounds of taking Populist sentiment seriously, 
arguing that in fact Populist attitudes contain rich cultural and historical significance.  ―In some 
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respects the seeming demagoguery of Populism anticipated the Know-Nothing nativist Fascists 
of our own time,‖ Kazin writes: 
For Populism was essentially a groundswell of protest, an amorphous rebellion that 
caught all the confusions and hatreds of the time.  Yet despite its gawkiness and the 
mounted banks who often seemed to lead it, Populism represented the first great 
challenge to the modern era.  Out of the suffering of the farmers who saw themselves 
cheated on every hand with the rise of monopoly capitalism streamed a new and 
aggressive political consciousness in America without which the liberalism of the future 
would have foundered, and upon which its aggressive drive toward economic democracy 
had an incalculable influence.
34
  
This is not to say that certain value judgments cannot be made with regard to populism both as a 
rhetorical strategy and an ideology. Sean Wilentz writes in The Age of Reagan of his intention to 
―analyze present-day events historically,‖ in light of the pitfalls of ―presntism‖ and partisanship.  
Objectivity is necessary, he writes, in order to produce a work ―more than propaganda, more than 
a reaffirmation of one‘s own prejudices.‖  However, he writes, objectivity does not mean 
―reporting all views or interpretations as equally valid.  Objectivity instead involves judging 
validity for oneself, fairly, and then inviting others to consider and argue over the evidence, 
logic, and fairness on which that judgment is based.‖
35
 Therefore keeping in mind the need to 
present a topic of inquiry not in terms of partisan propaganda, while at the same time noting the 
need to judge objectively the facts as presented on their own terms, a study on the rhetoric of Tea 
Party Movement can be made that fairly and accurately presents their presence in American 
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culture without retreating into stereotypes or false diagnoses nor without critiquing their 
influence in an engaging and meaningful way. 
 Writing on the American Progressive Era in the early 20
th
 century, Henry May 
commented that to many of even the earliest reformers, there was a marked need for restoration, 
though the structures of truth and goodness in America remained intact.  They advocated instead 
for a ―return to the past‖ and to ―get rid of the recent despoilers‖ in favor of the ―ideals of the 
founders.‖  Indeed, to ―drive the money-changers out of the temple‖ because ―the temple itself is 
perfectly sound.‖
36
  The Tea Party falls somewhere within this strain of thought, employing 
similar populist rhetoric of restoration and redemption, expressing a heightened need to reclaim 
the nation from corrupt, liberal over-spenders, who are recklessly and maliciously driving the 
country into ruin.  They also champion more ―populist‖ technological modes of communication, 
whether through radio, pamphleting, or the internet—anything that allows the ―common man‖ to 
experience the message of reclamation and anti-elitism over the unscrupulous and greedy elites. 
Charles Postel writes that the Populist Party of the 1890s (Populism with a capital ―P‖) 
reveals a collection of people revolting not against innovation and technological change, as some 
scholars have argued, but rather a dynamic and modern social movement pushing for ―alternative 
models of capitalism‖ and a technological and communicative restructuring of ―commercial and 
state institutions.‖  The Populist Party, Postel writes, was a modern political and economic 
reform movement that believed firmly in progress and the ―transforming power of science and 
technology,‖ attacking what it regarded as corrupt financial, railroad, and labor systems.  
―Populism,‖ Postel writes, ―was an expression of protest against impoverishment and against the 
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power of the corporate elite.‖
37
  In rejecting the traditional interpretation of the Populist Party as 
―primitive‖ and restorationist as Frederick Jackson Turner suggested in one of his famous essays, 
Postel writes that the Populists indeed equated democracy with notions of progress, highlighting 
many of their more modern sensibilities:  
Modernity entailed technologically sophisticated communication and mass media.  The 
telegraph, railroad, and steamship linked farm settlements with Chicago, New Orleans, 
Dallas, San Francisco, Cincinnati, New York, Liverpool, and London…Second-class 
postage brought millions of pounds of inexpensive newspapers and pamphlets into the 
rural heartland and brought millions of men and women into the national discussion of 
progress and reform.
38
 
Postel highlights the early Farmer‘s Alliance Movement that recognized the democratizing 
power of the press and the vital need to reclaim the newspapers from their ―corporate 
stranglehold‖ that one lecturer said was responsible for the ―greed, tyranny, and flunkeyism‖ 
prevailing in America.  Another Farmer‘s Alliance lecturer suggested that the ―power of the 
press‖ is a struggle between elites and progress: ―Shall we control it, or will we leave this, the 
greatest of all weapons, in the hands of others?‖
39
  Furthermore, the Farmer‘s Alliance created 
vast networks of rural newspapers to replace the unreliable ―corporate‖ newspapers.  For 
instance, reform newspapers like Southern Mercury, Progressive Farmer, Kansas Famer and 
others reveal a reliance on ―reprinting from one another, creating a network of shared 
information‖ that attempted to circumvent the mainstream press.
40
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 While much of the focus of this chapter stems from definitions of populism with a 
lowercase ―P,‖ taking a rhetorical approach offered by Kazin and others that defines populism as 
a ―mode of persuasion‖ or a style as opposed to an ideology, Postel‘s detailed analysis of the 
People‘s Party and the Farmer‘s Alliance of the 1880s and 1890s shows how the legacy of 
Populism as an ideology continues to reverberate through society. Populism, Postel writes, ―was 
a particular constellation of ideas, circulating within a specific coalition of reform, and set in 
motion within a distinct historical context.‖ However, to say that Populism was unsuccessful as a 
reform movement fails to recognize ―the impact [Populism] had on American life, and especially 
by the impetus that it provided for a wave of reform that carried into the new century.‖
41
 The 
rhetoric of populism shifts and conforms to various types of political communication, evidenced 
throughout much of the twentieth and twenty-first century, which is why populism, and its 
rhetorical stance on technology, progress, and democracy is employed by both the right and the 
left, from Huey Long to Father Coughlin to Ross Perot to the Tea Party Movement.  But the 
Populist Party of the late 19
th
 century claims a part of this rhetorical lineage, especially in its 
concise attitudes toward progress, the press, and communication technologies like the telegraph 
and telephone. 
 Capturing the legacy of the earlier Populists that opposed the inequalities of 
industrialization and the mass centralization of government, Father Charles Coughlin was 
notable for his famous radio sermons during the 1920s and 1930s during the Great Depression 
that evoked a similar rhetorical tradition of decrying private elites.  In the wake of the Great 
Depression, Christian, and increasingly Catholic, populists rose in prominence, championing the 
rights of the working man, denouncing unchecked wealth, and warning against the evils of a 
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centralized state.  ―Like the Populists in the 1890s,‖ Kazin writes, ―activists wanted both to pull 
down the rich and to raise the spiritual state of the nation.‖
42
  Coughlin, the son of Irish 
immigrants, established a church in the small industrial town of Royal Oak, Michigan called 
―Little Flower of Jesus,‖ and first began broadcasting his sermons on the air in 1926 after the 
local KKK planted a flaming cross in the church lawn.  Coughlin approached a manager of a 
local radio station to propose weekly radio sermons, remarking ―that he wanted to do something 
to fight bigotry and build up his church.‖  By 1930 he was broadcasting nationally to upwards of 
40 million listeners.
43
   
Coughlin espoused that the radio in particular was a medium of the ―public,‖ a means of 
communication broadcast in the language ―of the people:‖  ―I write the discourse,‖ Coughlin 
once told the New York Times,  
First in my own language, the language of a cleric.  Then I rewrite it, using metaphors the 
public can grasp, toning the phrases down to the language of the man-in-the street.  
Sometimes I coin a word to crystallize attention.  Radio broadcasting, I have found, must not 
be high hat.  It must be human, intensely human.  It must be simple, but it must be done up in 
metaphors.  It must deal with something vital to the life of the people, and it must be 
positive.
44
 
Above, we see Coughlin touting the radio as a communication technology of the people, 
chastising the elite in favor of simple, positive messages to affect the greatest possible political 
result.  A relatively new means of communication, the radio as a broadcast medium was quickly 
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growing to be the main source of news and entertainment of the American working class.  
Coughlin‘s presence on the radio was undoubtedly controversial, but to those who rarely read 
newspapers, which often tended to treat controversial figures like Coughlin with hostility, the 
radio was from the horse‘s mouth, and appealed to ―critics of concentrated wealth‖ who 
―routinely depicted the urban press as an oligopolistic barrier to social change and a censor of 
anti-corporate views.‖
45
 Coughlin was known for his unique blend of fiery evangelism, speaking 
to his listeners‘ sense of loss in the wake of the Depression, offering a message of hope and 
democracy in a ―soothing‖ language, evoking Christian populism and the ―rage of the common 
man.‖  He was noted for injecting colloquialisms like ―hot,‖ ―swell,‖ ―lousy,‖ and ―damn,‖ and 
he ―enthusiastically translated papal encyclicals about labor and poverty into the American 
vernacular.‖ Kazin writes, ―He unraveled the complexities of banking transactions and 
legislation concerning the economy.  He ridiculed pompous men of wealth like J.P. Morgan and 
allegedly myopic government officials.‖
46
 
To be clear, the populist rhetoric of Father Coughlin vaguely resembles the rhetoric of the 
Populist Party of the late 19
th
 century.  The Populists in their time assailed capitalism and the 
centralized power of elites, and more importantly offered an alternative vision of a decentralized 
economy.  Coughlin, on the other hand, seldom suggested that the answer to hegemonic power 
rested in individual, local reforms.  Rather, Coughlin generally argued in favor of positions that 
decried the ―menacing power of the great private banks.‖  In other words, ―the only remaining 
antidote to centralized power was the greatest of all institutions of centralized power.‖
47
 
Nevertheless, Coughlin utilized a populist rhetoric, communicating within the parameters set up 
                                                          
45
 Kazin, Populist Persuasion, 115. 
46
 Kazin, Populist Persuasion, 114. 
47
 Postel, Populist Vision, 166. 
35 
 
in the beginning of the chapter—setting up a ―people‖ through the needle of the ―enemy,‖ 
decrying the ―system,‖ and foreshadowing an apocalyptic final mêlée.  For example, in this 1937 
speech entitled ―Somebody Must be Blamed,‖ Coughlin, rejecting FDR‘s policies (a man he 
once openly supported), instead bemoans the failure of the new administration to effect change, 
lamenting the fall of capitalism at the hands of the ―international bankers‖ and those in power 
maliciously leading the country away from democracy toward communism and rancor: 
―Somebody must be blamed,‖ he said. 
Perhaps, perhaps another ambassador from another foreign capital shall come upon the scene. 
Perhaps, despite the advice of Washington of no foreign entanglements, despite the passage 
of the Jansen Act, which forbids us to lend money to those who already have borrowed it and 
who have not returned their loans, perhaps despite those things, some way, some miraculous 
way shall be found to project America into the next maelstrom. And democracy once more, 
thinking that it has power within its soul, shall rise up to clap and applaud, because the youth 
of the land is going abroad to make the world safe for what? Safe for dictatorship? Safe 
against communism abroad when we have communism at home? Safe from socialism in 
France when we have socialism in America? Or safe, safe for the international bankers?
48
 
Coughlin understands ―the people‖ and ―America‖ in danger of being subverted by malicious 
and deliberate detractors, but not from communists abroad, but from ―international bankers‖ at 
home, all the while American soldiers bravely fight for the principles of democracy in vain.  
Here we have populist rhetorical mode that Kazin and Lee define: a rhetorical system with 
complex roots that have linkages both historically and rhetorically with its Populist Party 
ancestors, despite their ideological differences.  These populist tropes yield particular attitudes 
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toward communication technology as well, as indicated by Coughlin‘s explicit stance on the 
radio mentioned above. 
Another example of populist rhetoric with particular emphases on technology is Ross 
Perot, a man Kazin called ―a secular Father Coughlin, armed with four-color charts and 
graphs.‖
49
  Kazin writes that amid the 1980s and 90s political rhetoric that, in a sense 
commodified populism as a sort of ―fashion statement‖ or a ―deliberate rhetorical project‖ 
covered in appeals to the ―working class,‖ there arose Ross Perot, the billionaire businessman 
from Texas who proposed massive budget cuts and spoke in a unique colloquial manner, a 
―Texas-accented ridicule of overdressed lobbyists and the ―country clubbers and ―preppies‖ in 
George Bush‘s White house.‖
50
 One of the most significant aspects of Perot‘s presidential 
campaign, which garnered some of the highest votes for an Independent presidential candidate in 
almost 70 years, was utilization of technology. Jonathan Laurence notes that Perot announcing 
his campaign for presidency on a cable talk show, Larry King Live, was a precedent in modern 
political communication.  By eschewing the traditional campaign strategies of the time, Perot 
―invigorated the talk-show circuit as a locus of campaign communication‖ which then spurred an 
unprecedented television advertising campaign.
51
  
Perot‘s use of ―new media‖ (in this sense cable talk show news as opposed to more 
―traditional‖ media like national news programs and seasoned newspapers like the New York 
Times and others), is notable in that the content of his campaign became ―more permeable‖ and 
his ―shrewd use of nontraditional media‖ garnered mass attention that ―spilled over into 
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traditional news-media domains.‖
52
 Perot‘s use of ―electronic town halls,‖ spots on popular talk 
shows and call-in radio shows, in addition to ―toll-free telephone numbers to disseminate 
campaign information‖ ushered a rise of a ―new, interactive communication genre, which 
circumvented the filter of traditional new media.‖
53
 Perot reasoned that ―If you talk to a thousand 
people a night seven nights a week, it takes you about three years to talk to a million.‖  And 
moreover, ―On shows where you get 20 and 30 million people…you realize the multiplier effect 
you can create with just one short comment—a nationwide reaction.‖
54
 Perot‘s presidential 
announcement on Larry King was a ―big bang‖ in political communication, which set the stage 
for Republicans like Bob Dole, who announced his candidacy for president in 1995 on Late 
Night with David Letterman.  Ultimately, more popular communication platforms, in this case 
talk shows and talk radio leads to more political inclusion, more room for nontraditional 
politicians/celebrities like Ross Perot (or more recently, businessman and television celebrity 
Donald Trump), to gain political access. These electronic platforms give untraditional politicians 
more impact, and moreover, more room for populist-style candidacies to flourish in the 
mainstream.
55
   
Laurence cautions, however, that ―all outsiders must eventually face the press, even if 
institutional reforms and new forms of direct communication have reduced the barriers to entry 
into the political arena.‖ Laurence‘s comment underscores the fact that while populist platforms, 
modes of communication, and otherwise ―untraditional‖ ways of addressing the people are 
powerful, the rhetoric nevertheless eventually must face the music and enter dominant discourse 
to have any sort of success.  Judging by the failure of the Populist Party, Coughlin‘s eventual 
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demise, and Ross Perot‘s succumbing to the criticism of his conspiratorial tendencies and failure 
to address any substantive issues in his campaigns, Laurence‘s theory on the success (or lack of 
success) of populism is a poignant analysis. Ross Perot‘s insistence on a more ―public‖ form of 
communication that can reach more people and his populist rhetorical frame that took potshots at 
elites who have unfairly taken control of the country, reveals a theme with regard to political 
communication and technology.  Coughlin‘s notion that the radio was a way to ensure 
democracy by reaching the ―public‖ or the ―common man,‖ the Populist Party‘s grip on 
newspapers, pamphlets, and other forms of communication to circumvent unreliable media that 
does not, in their view, serve the interest of the people—all indicate a trend in populist 
movements and views toward technology.   
For example, former governor of Alaska and Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin, 
speaking at the Tea Party National Convention in 2009, reiterated one of her often harped upon 
themes: that the mainstream media is unreliable.  Palin, notable for her use of social media like 
Twitter and Facebook, often eschews mainstream media, which she dubbed ―lamestream media‖ 
as a misrepresentation of conservative causes.  For instance, in a question and answer session 
after her initial address at the Tea Party Convention, Palin called the mainstream media 
―irrelevant‖ and moreover an institution attempting to undermine more ―traditional‖ values like 
patriotism and faith: 
Really, at the end of the day, who cares what an irrelevant, mainstream media is going to 
say about you? Who cares? The political hot shots that they want to take at you for 
standing up and saying what you believe in and proclaiming the patriotic love that you 
have for country and a lot of those in the mainstream media, they don't want to hear that. 
At the end of the day, it really doesn't matter what they have to say about you. 
39 
 
This view toward communication technology intersects with a populist rhetorical 
framework that depicts (consistent with Lee‘s 4 tropes of populism) a ―common people‖ against 
an ominous and elitist enemy: ―I really believe that there are more of us than they want us to 
believe,‖ she said.  ―That should empower us.  That should strengthen us and plow right on 
through it.‖  Moreover, at the beginning of her address, Palin asserted: ―I look forward to 
attending more Tea Party events in the near future.  It is so inspiring to see real people, not 
politicos‖ (emphasis added). In describing the Tea Party, Palin proclaimed: ―This is about the 
people. And it's bigger than any king or queen of a tea party. And it's a lot bigger than any 
charismatic guy with a teleprompter.‖ The core of the Tea Party, Palin contends, is ―the people,‖ 
whom she defines as: 
Everyday Americans, who grow our food and run our small businesses, who teach our 
kids and fight our wars. They're folks in small towns and cities across this great nation 
who saw what was happening and they saw and were concerned and they got involved. 
Like you, they go to town hall meetings and they write op-eds. They run for local office. 
You all have the courage to stand up and speak out. You have a vision for the future, one 
that values conservative principles and commonsense solutions. And if that sounds like 
you, then you probably, too, are feeling a bit discouraged by what you see in Washington, 
D.C.
56
 
Clearly evident in Palin‘s speech is the conceptualization of a common ―people,‖ the 
formation of an ―elite‖ that threatens those values, a condemnation of our current system, and a 
sense of an impending confrontation in which those traditional values will be restored to a time 
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when people were ―not being afraid to kind of go back to some of our roots as a God-fearing 
nation.‖
57
  
Palin also assails the mainstream media in favor of alternative modes of communication.  
For example, after an unflattering portrayal of Palin‘s disabled son on the television show Family 
Guy, Palin took to Facebook to chastise the writers for their insensitivity which felt, she writes, 
like ―a kick in the gut.‖
58
 Using social media technology like Facebook to respond to public 
events is a move, one journalist suggests, to ―Get her message out there more without having to 
use the media she claims produced personal and salacious reports about her and her family 
during the campaign.
59
  Populist rhetoric informs Palin‘s approach to technology, which an 
aversion to conceptions of the ―mainstream‖ in favor of alternative, untraditional modes that 
rhetorically appeal to a more ―common,‖ ―everyday‖ people. 
By highlighting various patterns of populist rhetoric in the People‘s Party, Father 
Coughlin, Ross Perot, and Sarah Palin, I point out sustained rhetorical patterns and a distinct 
association with communication technology.  Moreover, in addition to Lee‘s four rhetorical 
tropes of populism and Kazin‘s broad description of populism as a linguistic mode of persuasion, 
I argue that there is a distinct attitude toward technology, specifically communication 
technology, enabled by populist rhetoric. Viewing some means of communication with disdain, 
and others with reverence for its ability to reach ―the people‖ more easily, underscores a 
recurrent trend in populist movements in particular and pervasive in American culture in general, 
to be explored with regard to the Tea Party in the next chapter, and explored more deeply in the 
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last chapter in terms of the implications toward democracy, civil engagement, and the public 
sphere.
42 
 
Chapter 2: The Tea Party Movement in Context 
Legend has it that the spark which ignited the grassfire known as the Tea Party 
Movement began on February 19
th
, 2009, when CNBC business news commentator Rick 
Santelli, just one month after the inauguration of President Obama, began fuming on the floor of 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, rebuking Obama‘s aid to homeowners facing foreclosure, 
charging that the Obama administration was ―promoting bad behavior‖ by subsidizing what he 
called ―the losers‘ mortgages.‖  He shouted, ―This is America!‖ adding, ―We‘re thinking of 
having a Chicago Tea Party in July.  All you Capitalists that want to show up to Lake Michigan, 
I‘m going to start organizing…we‘re going to be dumping in some derivative securities, what do 
you think about that?‖
1
 McGrath noted that within hours of what became known as ―The Rant 
Heard ‗Round the World,‖ ―a Web site, OfficialChicagoTeaParty.com, had gone live, and by the 
end of the following week dozens of small protests were occurring simultaneously around the 
country.
2
 The rant went viral, the story goes, generating millions of views and inspiring mini 
movements all around the country that eventually coalesced into a unified Tea Party Movement, 
angry about the climbing national debt and the failure of both parties in finding a remedy for our 
financial crisis. 
 This is only partially correct.  As Kate Zernike notes, the movement we now know today 
as the Tea Party began as a loose confederation of conservative bloggers, whose scattered 
protests throughout the country had been gaining momentum for months until Rick Santelli 
finally gave it a name.  In fact, the first Tea Party protest was actually three days before Santelli 
went on the air, orchestrated by 29 year old conservative blogger Keli Carender, writing under 
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the pseudonym ―Liberty Belle.‖ Carender, a vocal minority of young conservatives in Seattle, 
decided to form her own protest, called the ―Anti-Porkulus Protest,‖ a term borrowed from 
conservative radio host Rush Limbaugh. With the help and publicity from local conservative 
radio hosts in Seattle and other conservative bloggers, Carender organized what many consider 
to be the first Tea Party rally on February 16
th
, 2009. All Rick Santelli did, Zernike writes, was 
―give the discontent a name, and a bit of imagery.‖
3
  
Perhaps the most significant impetus for the Tea Party movement‘s meteoric rise was 
from a technology consultant and self-described ―grassroots new media strategist.‖  Before 
Carender‘s first protest, Michael Patrick Leahy, former delegate to the Republican National 
Convention in 2008, had been writing for some time about what he called a ―technology gap‖ 
between Republicans and Democrats.  Leahy urged conservatives to follow his 15 ―tactical rules 
for conservative radicals,‖ which involved taking advantage of free, cheap, and fast new media 
communication technologies like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.
4
  After Obama‘s election in 
2009, Leahy began collecting names of conservative activists on Twitter, a social networking site 
where people micro-blog 140 character ―tweets‖ to their ―followers‖ or blog subscribers.  Twitter 
was the only place, Leahy observed, liberals had not already claimed as their own.  "I found 
there were a lot of conservatives on Twitter, and they were lonesome and competitive," he told 
the Wall Street Journal. "We got up to 1,500 [names] within weeks."
5
 Leahy organized a list of 
Twitter users he called ―Top Conservatives on Twitter‖ or #TCOT, a searchable hashtag that 
allows various followers to read and keep up with other conservatives, as well as code their own 
relevant tweets that others can see.   
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After Carender‘s initial protest, which gained publicity among conservative bloggers and 
talk radio hosts, in addition to Santelli‘s now infamous rant, which was publicized by FOX News 
just hours later, Leahy pounced, and began organizing weekly conference calls among prominent 
conservative bloggers and activists.  Taking Santelli‘s cue, Leahy, utilizing his growing list of 
contacts, helped organize Santelli‘s call for a Chicago Tea Party, which he also synchronized 
with other activists‘ protests around the country the following week, on February 27
th
, 2009.  
Writing on a guest blog of The Telegraph, Leahy proudly urged everyone to join him: ―The tea 
party will be held in Chicago, at dozens of locations around the US, and on Twitter, using the 
#teaparty hashtag.‖
6
  On February 27th, 2009, the day of the protest, Leahy and company 
counted ―fifty-one events across the country, with thirty thousand people attending in all.‖
7
 
Carender‘s first protest, Santelli‘s rant three days later, and the new media prowess of Leahy (in 
addition to other, smaller conservative protests aimed at the economy) catapulted scattered 
protests into large-scale events.
8
 
Despite the common history, without any strict, coherent ideological backbone and no 
national spokesperson or leader, the ―Tea Party‖ conceptualized as a large cohesive movement is 
difficult to quantify, let alone describe, as one description of a Tea Party sympathizer may 
diverge from the views of another. Most social movement theorists would agree, though, that 
while ―social movements do exhibit less social differentiation than settled social groups,‖ it does 
not mean that they are ―necessarily homogeneous or united.‖
9
 However, with such a wide swath 
of Tea Party supporters, from those on the fringes exhibiting racial under (and over) tones, to the 
                                                          
6
 Milo Yiannopoulos, ―A message from Michael Patrick Leahy: Join The Chicago Tea Party!‖ The Telegraph, 
February 21
st
, 2009. 
7
 Zernike, Boiling Mad, 22 
8
 Zernike, Boiling Mad, 22.  Zernike also goes into much greater detail about all the mini-movements that made up 
the initial drive of the Tea Party movement. 
9
 John Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements, New York: Basic Books, (1973), 8 
45 
 
young libertarian conservatives with more socially liberal views, we nevertheless see an 
organizational dilemma with regard to the Tea Party.  How do you effectively organize such 
diffuse and disparate strains of thought when the only prevailing and unifying idea is fiscal 
conservatism (and even there Tea Party members split into different camps)?
10
  
The answer, in part, lies in Internet Communication Technologies, or social media.  
Blogs, social networking, and wikis were the media of choice for the originators of the Tea Party 
Movement, and fuel much of the current activity of Tea Party organization, dissemination of 
information, and inter-group communication.  Therefore, studying the new media practices of 
several prominent Tea Party websites is valuable in order to gauge not only how the Tea Party 
can organize such a popular and relevant social movement, but also how the Tea Party 
understands itself and its role in civic engagement.  Through a close rhetorical analysis of several 
Tea Party websites, specifically Tea Party Patriots, Tea Party Express, and FreedomWorks, we 
see the complexities of the Tea Party‘s new media engagement with regard to organization, 
communication, and ideas about citizenship and democracy.  I argue that the Tea Party 
movement, while disparate in its political motivations, ideas, and attitudes about the role of 
activism, nevertheless construct a consistent populist rhetorical narrative about the role of 
technology, framing it as an indispensible method for acquiring new members, spreading their 
message, and fighting for ―freedom‖ and ―democracy.‖  Moreover, I argue that this reflects a 
prevailing ideology in America in general, and within the Tea Party in particular, that views 
technology as representations of democracy, liberty, and a valuable check on powerful and 
unreliable media, and other various types of ―fat cat‖ elites and populist adversaries.  
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Part of this approach relies on various understandings of the relationship between 
political rhetoric and culture, and also definitions of populism from chapter 1.  For instance, 
Hariman analyzes political rhetoric as an art, or a political ―style:‖ Political style, he writes, is a 
―coherent repertoire of rhetorical conventions depending on aesthetic reactions for political 
effect.‖
 11
  Hariman outlines various typologies of political styles as a method to better 
understand politics, and furthermore to argue that political rhetoric can shape culture and civic 
engagement in general. ―Ordinary political actors in our culture,‖ Hariman writes,  
Routinely persuade by mastering considerations of costume, tone, and timing without 
suffering moral deterioration.  Furthermore, questions of freedom, equality, and justice 
often are raised and addressed through performances ranging from debates to 
demonstrations without loss of moral content.  An attention to appearances doesn‘t 
disregard certain values so much as it looks for the problems and techniques shaping their 
successful performance, on the assumption that values only can be taken seriously once 
performed successfully.‖
12
   
Hariman, along with others like James Boyd White, who writes that words produce ―the methods 
by which culture is maintained, criticized, and transformed,‖ theoretically informs my rhetorical 
approach to the Tea Party‘s use of new media.
13
  Along with Kazin‘s notion of a ―linguistically 
informed history‖ I approach the Tea Party rhetorically and historically to get a sense of how the 
Tea Party‘s rhetoric about and use of new media is embedded in a particular historical and 
cultural context.  In this way I show that the Tea Party uses a populist framework to rhetorically 
                                                          
11
 Robert Hariman, Political Style:  The Artistry of Power, New Practices of Inquiry (Chicago:  University of 
Chicago Press, 1995), 4. 
12
 Hariman, Political Style, 10. 
13
 James B. White, When Words Lose Their Meaning:  Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, 
and Community (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 279. 
47 
 
situate itself in a particular relationship with new media, one in which new media is 
synonymous, if not essential, in the ―battle‖ for democracy, liberty, and freedom.  
Also, populist rhetoric uses several strategies with regard to the media.  Stewart, 
Mazzoleni, and Horsfield argue that the media is significant in the rise of what they call ―neo-
populist‖ movements.  Their study, while conducted on a global scale including countries from 
Europe and Asia, nevertheless provides an informative backdrop and a frame of reference for 
how the Tea Party frames and understands technology.  Though populism can be described as 
―vague,‖ ―slippery,‖ and ―chameleonic,‖ there are nevertheless common ways in which populist 
movements interact with the media: 
 Identification as a ―media underdog‖ to gain popular support 
 Use of professional expertise 
 Reversion to more traditional ―unmediated‖ forms of communication such as 
rallies 
 Clever exploitation of ―free‖ media publicity 
 Strategies to attract media attention (staging media ―events‖) 
 Strategic attacks on the media14 
As we will see, particularly with developing ―strategies to attract media attention,‖ ―use of 
professional expertise‖ and constructing the movement as a type of ―media underdog,‖ the Tea 
Party‘s use of new media validates Stewart et al.‘s assumptions that the media is particularly 
significant with regard to the development of populist movements.  The Tea Party‘s populist 
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rhetorical frame reveals itself in their use of new media to take advantage of ―free‖ and ―easy‖ 
communication mediums, employing ―new media strategists‖ and using new media to stage 
public events and rallies.  While Stewart et al. are focusing on the ways populist groups are 
interacting with the professional media, I think the same parallel could be made not only with 
how they interact with professional media, but also how they use ―new media,‖ which, as defined 
earlier, represents a constellation of media changes, where ―consumers‖ are increasingly 
becoming media ―producers‖ themselves.
15 
In order to understand the Tea Party‘s use and understanding of new media, we need to 
understand first how the Tea Party understands itself logistically and institutionally among the 
political/cultural landscape.  The advocates of what is now the Tea Party operate more or less 
under a general ideological umbrella of fiscal conservatism and a shared sense of outrage at the 
2009 stimulus bills as well as the health care reform bills of 2010.  However, the movement is 
decentralized—there are no specifically delineated leaders, though many politicians associate 
themselves with Tea Party issues and many more are thwarting republican and democratic 
incumbents in elections across the country.
16
  The Tea Party is self-described as non-
hierarchical—a network of political conservatives who operate from the local, grassroots level, 
with hundreds of local Tea Party coordinators meeting through conference calls once a week to 
discuss issues and raise concerns. This loose, networked organizational style mimics the Tea 
Party‘s own concerns over an overtly centralized government and functions as a ―self-
propelling‖ movement, deliberately described by many coordinators in terms similar to those 
used to describe the Internet: ―open-sourced,‖ ―networked,‖ and ―horizontal.‖  Organizing in this 
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way is cheap, effective, and more importantly befuddling to many who seek to understand the 
Tea Party, often searching for a way to define it by isolating a leader, which, as Jonathan Rauch 
notes, is as absurd as asking ―who owns the internet?‖
17
  
However, despite the claims of grassroots, bottom-up organization and the appropriation 
of ―open-sourced‖ rhetoric, the Tea Party has faced charges by many of its detractors as being a 
phony movement of wealthy American aristocrats posing as arbiters of a grassroots movement 
comprised of ―regular people.‖  Some have charged that the Tea Party is ―Astroturf,‖ or rather, 
an artificially constructed grassroots movement, due in part to its heavy coverage by FOX News, 
donations from extremely wealthy conservatives, and financial assistance from influential 
politicians, most notably Sarah Palin and former House Majority Leader Dick Armey, who runs 
the aforementioned organization FreedomWorks.
18
  
The statistical makeup of the Tea Party indicates some relatively unsurprising trends.  A 
study conducted by Bloomberg found that ―Tea Party supporters are likely to be older, white and 
male. Forty percent are age 55 and over, compared with 32 percent of all poll respondents; just 
22 percent are under the age of 35, 79 percent are white, and 61 percent are men. Many are also 
Christian fundamentalists, with 44 percent identifying themselves as ―born-again,‖ compared 
with 33 percent of all respondents‖
19 A Gallup Poll indicates a similar trend: ―Tea Party 
supporters are decidedly Republican and conservative in their leanings. Also, compared with 
average Americans, supporters are slightly more likely to be male and less likely to be lower-
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income.‖
20
  White, Christian, conservative men with money are thus a huge component of the 
Tea Party.  The largest Tea Party survey by CBS/New York Times gives similar data as well.
21
 
Given the relatively mainstream demographic of Tea Party members (white, Christian, 
male), the Tea Party has been accused of racism and paranoia among its ranks by many critics. 
Particularly at the rallies themselves, the media often capture photographs of protest-signs that 
are racial in nature.  For example, a Tea Party activist in Houston was photographed at a rally 
with a sign that read ―Congress = slave owner, Taxpayer = niggar [sic].
22
 Many other racially 
tinged Tea Party rally signs and comments have been cited as an example of an underling racial 
nativism toward President Obama and other minority groups.
23
  Individual organizers themselves 
have been charged with racism as well.  For example, Sonny Thomas, a Tea Party organizer in 
Springboro, Ohio, posted to his Twitter page in April: ―Illegals everywhere today! So many spics 
makes me feel like a speck. Grrr. Wheres my gun!?‖
24  Tea Party opponents also charge that a 
racial undercurrent of Tea Party resentment is more implicit in nature.  For example, Glenn 
Beck, one of the most popular Tea Party supporters, whose television show is the most popular 
of all the cable news networks combined,  held a rally on the Washington Mall in August of 
2010 on the 47
th
 anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King‘s ―I have a Dream‖ speech.  Beck, in 
promoting the event, was quoted as saying, ―We are on the right side of history! We are on the 
side of individual freedoms and liberties and, dammit, we will reclaim the civil rights 
movement.‖
25
 A group mostly composed of white men organizing under a banner of 
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―reclaiming‖ civil rights undoubtedly caused outrage, if not raised eyebrows, among many Tea 
Party detractors.
26
   
Questions of whether or not the Tea Party is racist or ―Astroturf‖ are perhaps too simple 
to answer definitively.  However, a better argument may be that the rhetoric of decentralization, 
the so-called ―networked‖ approach to Tea Party organization and its loosely coherent platform 
allows for these more vociferous, antagonistically racist supporters to have more of a voice than 
other organizations.  Interestingly, though, the three most important Tea Party organizations 
more or less promote similar agendas, most of which either explicitly or implicitly condemn 
racist or otherwise antagonistic behavior.  The mission statement of Tea Party Patriots states: 
―The impetus for the Tea Party movement is excessive government spending and taxation. Our 
mission is to attract, educate, organize, and mobilize our fellow citizens to secure public policy 
consistent with our three core values of Fiscal Responsibility, Constitutionally Limited 
Government and Free Markets.‖ The group also states that they are ―a non-partisan grassroots 
organization of individuals united by our core values derived from the Declaration of 
Independence, the Constitution of the United States of America, and the Bill Of Rights as 
explained in the Federalist Papers.‖
27
 Freedom Works has a more succinct mission in its 
masthead: ―Lower taxes, less government, more freedom.‖
28
 And finally, Tea Party Express 
likewise chastises the ―Washington politicians‖ for failing the American people with its 
ineffective and destructive ―bailouts, out-of-control deficit spending, government takeovers of 
sectors of the economy, Cap & Trade, government-run health care, and higher taxes! If you 
thought we were just going to quietly go away,‖ they write, ―or that this tea party movement 
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would be just a passing fad, you were mistaken.  We‘re taking our country back!‖
29
 A running 
theme in each of these mission statements or core sets of values is derision toward overspending 
and taxes, and stressing the imperativeness of a need to ―go back‖ to a simpler political 
landscape, in which the government intervened, and the individual ―freedom‖ of Americans was 
―encroached upon,‖ less.  
Nevertheless, the national Tea Party groups seem to be at odds with the supporters, 
attracting attention and criticism at the local level.  For example, the Tea Party‘s broad 
ideological premises naturally invite a wide swath of supporters, which garners harsh critique 
and criticism from both sides of the political spectrum.  The Tea Party umbrella gives a voice to 
fragmented political outsiders, like ―footloose Ron Paul supporters, gold bugs, evangelicals, 
Atlas Shruggers, militiamen, strict Constitutionalists, swine-flu skeptics, scattered 9/11 
―truthers,‖ neo-―Birchers,‖ and, of course, ―birthers‖—those who remained convinced that the 
President was a Muslim double agent born in Kenya.‖
30
 Matt Lilla from the New York Review 
of Books is equally skeptical of the Tea Party, highlighting its ―aimless‖ individualism and 
privileged disposition. He describes the Tea Party as a crude form of populism that is: 
Nourished by the same libertarian impulses that have unsettled American society for half 
a century now. Anarchistic like the Sixties, selfish like the Eighties, contradicting neither, 
it is estranged, aimless, and as juvenile as our new century. It appeals to petulant 
individuals convinced that they can do everything themselves if they are only left alone, 
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and that others are conspiring to keep them from doing just that. This is the one threat 
that will bring Americans into the streets.
31
   
Lilla is very critical of the fervor with which Tea Party supporters flock to the streets to protest, 
deriding the movement as ―aimless‖ and a continuance of meaningless and ill-informed uprisings 
throughout American history, falsely claiming the identity of victimhood, valuing autonomy and 
individual choice over collective interests. 
But despite what some may call an ―aimless‖ disposition, one binding element of the Tea 
Party is Internet-based communication and social media, its use of which form a particular 
narrative about the role of technology in fostering democracy, liberty, and a 21
st
 century protest 
identity.  Carender‘s ―Liberty Belle‖ blog gained popularity with conservative talk shows and 
main stream media, which accelerated her ―Porkulus‖ and Tax Day Tea Party protests. Santali‘s 
CNBC rant was, as McGrath noted, ―highly YouTube-able, and all the more effective to the 
alienated masses.‖
32
 The Tea Party‘s heavy emphasis on internet-based communication 
manifests itself on the local level, too. For instance, the Valdosta, Georgia Tea Party affiliate, 
which hosted a Valdosta Tea Party Study Action group in July of 2010, a member gave a 
presentation entitled ―Technology is Changing how we Communicate.‖  The presentation cited 
Twitter and Facebook as democratizing forces that operate on a global level, as evident in the 
Iranian election scandals of 2009 and the military coup in Honduras.  Making the connection to 
the Tea Party, the presentation made it clear that new media communication was useful for their 
organization as well:   
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Obama and the liberals were able to fully utilize these methodologies during the 2008 
campaigns and they did it well. Now conservatives and others are catching up. And I can 
tell you from what I‘ve seen, we‘re catching up an exponential rate. Other folks are 
getting their messages together and out there quickly…[new media] allows you as an 
individual to research and get ACTUAL information from people around the world in 
real time and not rely on biased news sources.
33
  
The presentation stresses two important factors about the Tea Party‘s new media communication: 
1) that the Tea Party is in desperate need to ―catch up‖ to the new media ―methodologies‖ of 
liberals and 2) that this method of communication is a more reliable way for individuals to 
disseminate information and circumvent more unreliable mainstream media.  Indeed, this notion, 
that new media combats mainstream, biased media, is a recurring theme in populist rhetoric.  As 
noted in Chapter 1, such disparate populist leaders like Father Coughlin and Ross Perot both 
show a disposition toward the media of the ―common man,‖ a rhetorical frame suggesting that 
the technological medium is the ideal way to reach the ―people.‖ 
As for the first point, that the local Tea Party leader felt the need to ‗catch up‖ to liberal 
new media engagement, it appears the Tea Party is attempting to do just that.  A nonpartisan 
voter registration site recently released a report that reveals Republicans are winning the ―social 
media war‖ by a landslide, with over four times as many Facebook fans than democrats, and five 
times as many ―followers‖ on Twitter. Conservative voices dominate the social media landscape, 
the report suggests, with the Tea Party ranking 11
th
 in popularity, as measured by the number of 
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combined fans on both Facebook and Twitter.
34
 Another study suggests that conservative blogs 
communicate and interact with each other more frequently than liberal blogs, and ―hyperlink‖ to 
each other more frequently as well.
35
 Ackland supported this conclusion, noting that 
conservatives indeed have a more noticeable presence in cyberspace.
36
  All of these points 
notwithstanding, the feeling of needing to ―catch up‖ to the new media tactics may suggest, as 
one scholar has written, that there is nevertheless a lack of a centralized community hub of 
conservative blogs that matches the influence of MoveOn.org or DailyKOS.  So while 
conservative activists and bloggers have more presence online, which is something Hill and 
Hughes suggested even in the 1990s, the lack of centralization and a truly powerful community 
―hub‖ of organizers may be preventing the kind of influence online that rivals liberal new media 
engagement.
37
 
The gap in a meaningful technological presence, despite widespread publicity, very much 
informs the online fervor of Tea Party groups at the local level, a fervor on which national Tea 
Party groups was eager to capitalize.  This interrelationship between local Tea Party groups and 
the efforts of powerful mainstream media and political action organizations indicates the 
complexity of the Tea Party movement and its relationship to new media and by extension, the 
identity of the movement.  After Carrander‘s original protest and Santelli‘s infamous rant, Tea 
Party publicity continued to grow, particularly through coverage from traditional media and 
support from Glenn Beck, Sean Hannity, and other big-name media pundits.  The 
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aforementioned mission statements of the three most prominent Tea Party affiliated websites 
shows a concerted effort to construct a concise set of goals and a unified agenda in an effort to 
build more of an integrated community of new media activists.  A brief history of these 
organizations shows that despite the populist vision and similar deterministic approaches to 
technology, in-group fighting, controversy, and other issues with Tea Party‘s new media 
engagement reveal significant limits to civic engagement and critical/rational debate. 
Jenny Beth Martin, and Amy Kremer, both conservative bloggers from Georgia, and 
participants in Leahy‘s original conference call, created their own social networking site in 
March of 2009 called Tea Party Patriots, the first major national umbrella group for the Tea 
Party Movement.  Originally a local start-up to publicize some of the first Tea Party protests, Tea 
Party Patriots now boasts one of the largest followings of Tea Party supporters.  Upon 
registering as a member of Tea Party Patriots, the organization immediately requests that its 
members get involved.  ―If you are concerned with the current state of the American 
government,‖ the page reads, ―then now is the time to take action.  Tea Party Patriots has 
numerous positions available for you to do your part to help save America.‖  Below the opening 
statement are opportunities for volunteers to sign up to be journalists, state directors, local 
coordinators, national event organizers, web moderators, media consultants, friends and family 
coordinators, percolators, rapid response team members, DC rapid response team members, or to 
help with graphics and photography.  Tea Party Patriots offers members the opportunity to view 
and sign up for Tea Party events around the country, join local affiliate groups by state, read and 
contribute their own blogs, buy Tea Party memorabilia, and there is even a ―recommended 
reading‖ section designated for affiliated Tea Party books and pamphlets.   
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The main mechanism by which Tea Party Patriot members communicate is through the 
―Patriot Feed,‖ a type of discussion board simultaneously linked to Twitter—posts made to the 
patriot feed can be broadcast to a particular member‘s Twitter account as well as the Tea Party 
board.  The Patriot feed features a text box with the prompt: ―What are you doing to preserve 
liberty?‖ along with a brief introductory ―about‖ section for new posters: 
When people first arrive, they are standing up for the first time. They are not accustomed 
to having their voices heard. We don't want to scare them away! Their first post is not the 
time to overwhelm them with all the intensity and urgency of our current challenges. 
Save the urgent messages for an old timer who can handle it. The new people will see it 
too, if they stick around. They are HERE, at the Tea Party. That's a huge first step. Please 
welcome them in a way that acknowledges them for taking that step and lets them know 
that we're glad they're here! Thank you fellow Patriots, Je235
38
 
What makes this introductory note interesting is the way the administrator ―Je235‖ cautions Tea 
Party members not to ―scare away‖ new members with ―intensity‖ or ―urgency‖ that the cause 
can generate (rightfully, the administrator suggests).  The message is a note first to welcome new 
members with open arms.  But the administrator is also trying to preemptively deter vitriolic 
discussion from taking place on the board, perhaps in a deliberate attempt to dissuade more vocal 
Tea Party members from rhetoric that would make new members who are ―standing up for the 
first time‖ uneasy about joining a social movement with a reputation for heated rhetoric, or to 
restrict debate on the board only to topics that the moderator deems valuable (a restriction on 
democratic exchange I talk more about in Chapter 3). The other interesting part of the ―Patriot 
Feed‖ is the striking parallelism with Twitter, the social networking service that asks its users 
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―What are you doing?‖ as its simple prompt.  Tea Party Patriots offer an addendum to Twitter‘s 
initial question, adding ―to preserve liberty‖ at the end, suggesting that social networking and 
micro-blogging are useful tools for spreading liberty.  Also, the notion that people need to 
publicize what they are doing to preserve liberty indicates that liberty itself is being ―taken 
away,‖ all specific examples of a distinct populist rhetorical framework about the uses and goals 
of technology. 
And then there is Tea Party Express, an organization out of California run by republican 
consultants Joe Wierzbicki and Sal Russo, who were ―flabbergasted‖ at the massive size of a Tea 
Party rally in Sacramento, and decided to form their own cross-country bus tour to spread the 
Tea Party‘s message of fiscal conservatism and outrage at the Obama administration‘s 
mishandling of the economy.  Tea Party Express is a project from the political action group 
known as ―Our Country Deserves Better,‖ founded by Russo‘s political consultant firm ―Russo 
Marsh and Rogers.‖  Russo, the principal organizer of Tea Party Express, was a former aide to 
Ronald Reagan as well as former New York governor George Pataki.  According to the New 
York Times, Tea Party Express is ―now the single biggest independent supporter of Tea Party 
candidates, raising more than $5.2 million in donations since January, 2009.‖
39
 Wierzbicki and 
Russo devised the concept of the Tea Party Express in the days after the ―Tax Day Tea Parties‖ 
of 2009, where they deliberately planned to capitalize on the Tea Party‘s success by organizing a 
nation-wide bus tour that makes stops in the cities of ―big spender‖ congressmen and 
congresswomen who were in need of being ousted by Tea Party candidates.  This campaigning 
tool also raised significant amounts of money.  For instance, Tea Party Express spent over 
$350,000, Zernike writes, on the campaign for Republican Scott Brown in his 2010 victory over 
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Martha Coakley in the Massachusetts senate race, nearly $1 million in Nevada in support of Tea 
party candidate Sharron Angle in 2010..
40
  Tea Party Express soon raised close to 7 million 
dollars for the cause.
41
 
From the beginning, Tea Party Express involved itself in political candidates, organizing 
with FreedomWorks and other Tea Party groups to raise money for Republican campaigns that 
aligned with Tea Party goals.  The Tea Party Express differs from Tea Party Patriots in this 
regard, as the latter strove to remain an ideological, issues-based movement with no delineated 
leaders, while the former wanted to raise money to help plan political campaigns.  ―Our local 
coordinators told us they didn‘t want us to endorse candidates,‖ Beth Martin of Tea Party 
Patriots told the Wall Street Journal. And when the Tea Party Express invited the Tea Party 
Patriots on their first national bus tour, a rift arouse between the two founders of Tea Party 
Patriots, as Kremer envisioned an organization involved in political campaigning, and Martin a 
grassroots movement devoted to nonpartisanship and issues-based activism.  ―Ultimately, 
[Kremer] rode on the tour.  There she began to find her voice in front of crowds, and liked it.‖  
This ultimately led to the division between Tea Party Patriots and Tea Party Express, with 
Kremer being voted off the board of Tea Party Patriots and later accepting a job at Tea Party 
Express as their national coordinator.
42
 
The emphasis on raising money in support of Tea Party candidates contradicts some other 
Tea Party group philosophies.  Mark Meckler, spokesman of the Tea Party Patriots, told the New 
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York Times that the Tea Party Express is ―the antithesis to what the Tea Party Movement is 
about‖ because they are a ―classic top-down organization run by G.O.P. consultants.‖
43
  While 
Tea Party Express focuses more of its attention on advertising, which divided prominent 
members of the Tea Party and attracted others, one thing is clear: the group indeed raises a lot of 
money, produces a lot of advertising, and communicates its messages to thousands.
44
 Their 
parent website OurCountryDeservesBetter.com, states its core values of leading a ―fight‖ to 
ensure ―lower taxes, smaller government, strong national defense, and respect for the strength of 
the family as the core of a strong America.‖  Moreover, ―Our nation‘s future is at stake‖ the 
―About Us‖ section of Our Country Deserves Better PAC reads, and it is up to the people to 
―stand up to Barack Obama.‖
45
 Tea Party Express, the largest campaign of Our Country 
Deserves Better PAC, touts a similar message on its website, TeaPartyExpress.org, but with 
fewer opportunities to get involved than the Tea Party Patriots site.  At TeaPartyExpress.org, the 
site offers opportunities to view tour schedules, a list of ―targets‖ and ―endorsements‖ of various 
candidates for senate and the house, a selection of news coverage and video blogs from political 
commentators, a blog site, and a section to donate money and buy Tea Party Express 
merchandise.  The section to create your own blog is open to everyone with Google accounts, but 
the profile views and user comments are small and, at present, have not been updated for nearly a 
year.
46
   
For an organization with such stock in campaigning and advertising, the technological 
muscle seems less invested in the impact of individuals on the grassroots level and more on the 
larger mission of mobilization garnered by politicians with the goal of winning elections.  
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According to a September, 2009 CNN Article, rather than mobilizing from the bottom-up, Tea 
Party Express uses its prowess for executing larger goals of defeating Obama‘s health care 
reform bill, taking back the House and Senate in 2010, and winning the White house in 2012. 
Wierzbicki, referred to in the article as the ―architect‖ of the Tea Party Movement, a designation 
to which Carender and others may object, suggested that it is only after the 2010 elections that a 
national leader may need to surface: ―From then to 2012 is probably the period of time when 
you'll find a big national leader that will emerge that the majority of the people in this movement 
will feel comfortable following,‖ he told CNN.
 47
 Until then, intense lobbying and campaigning 
or specific candidates sympathetic to Tea Party issues will suffice.   
Though more targeted and precise in its mission, Tea Party Express nevertheless has a 
similar frame with regard to new media.  Tea Party Express uses Twitter, Facebook, blogs, and 
discussion boards to garner support, but less investment is made in the use of technology to 
organize and communicate with each other and more investment in the technology itself to 
influence others.  Also, online support of Tea Party Express is significantly lower than Tea Party 
Patriots, with nearly 8,000 followers on Twitter and under 400 fans on Facebook, while Tea 
Party Patriots boasts nearly 8,400 followers and Twitter and over 560,000 fans on Facebook. 
The dual existence of political factions within particular social movements, with one having an 
influence in campaigns and elected officials, and the other on mere advocacy, is common.
48
  But 
here, new media engagement appears to happen more frequently and with greater frequency in 
the advocacy domain of social movements than the political. 
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A political action committee founded in 1984, Freedomworks began working with the 
Tea Party Patriots and other affiliated Tea Party groups in an attempt to blend the Tea Party 
message with their more seasoned libertarian views they had been unsuccessfully pushing for the 
past several years.  Zernike writes, ―While many groups on the right moved to seize the Tea 
Party energy as it grew in the early months of 2009, it was FreedomWorks that moved first and 
most aggressively.  And very quickly, the FreedomWorks ideology became the Tea Party 
ideology.‖
49
  Zernike writes that FreedomWorks was responsible for a lot of the streamlining of 
the Tea Party‘s digital activism and social mobilization on a much larger scale.  FreedomWorks 
staff member Brendan Steinhauser drove the Tea Part Movement forward by posting tips and 
instructions for holding Tea Party protests on a website set up within hours of Santelli‘s rant 
called IAmWithRick.com, which included instructions for creating Facebook pages, linking 
other blogs, requesting publicity from talk radio and the media, and keeping lists of email 
addresses to grow the movement.  FreedomWorks and Tea Party Patriots worked very closely, 
forming a ―broad nationwide coalition with local affiliates—sometimes dozens of them—in 
every state,‖ Zernike writes. ―Anyone who Googled ―Tea Party‖ would find that the Tea Party 
Patriots website was the first to pop up, with a link to locate a local Tea Party group, and a how-
to for starting your own.‖
50
 Freedomworks and Tea Party Patriots worked so closely together, in 
fact, that others have alleged the two organizations are not separate from each other at all.  
Rolling Stone reported that after orchestrating the original Tea Party protests in April of 2009, 
FreedomWorks handed over the reins to Tea Party Patriots in name, but still call the shots within 
both organizations.  Rolling Stone cites emails on a private listserv that indicate FreedomWorks 
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vetoed a decision to change a Tea Party Patriots logo, as well as circulating a handbook for 
disrupting town hall meetings for ―spontaneous‖ and angry Tea Party protests.
51
 
With almost 600,000 Facebook fans, and over 12,000 fans on Twitter, FreedomWorks 
indeed stakes a significant claim on the social media landscape. Their own website offers far 
greater avenues for membership engagement than Tea Party Patriots or Tea Party Express.  The 
―About‖ page reads that FreedomWorks ―recruits, educates, trains and mobilizes millions of 
volunteer activists to fight for less government, lower taxes, and more freedom.‖
52
 
FreedomWorks provides an extensive list of issues talking-points and stances, from issues of 
privacy to healthcare to border security.  Notable are the ―Technology Policy‖ talking points, 
which support less taxes and government regulation on technological innovation.  These 
restrictions, they argue, ―pigeonhold companies—especially telephone companies, and make it 
difficult for them to react in a dynamic marketplace.‖  Moreover, technological innovations in 
communications technology, they argue, need to be ―first to the market with their idea or 
concept.‖
53
  These positions align distinctly with FreedomWorks‘ longstanding libertarian 
position on economics, but moreover suggest an understanding of technological innovation as 
synonymous with progress, democracy and liberty.  A related blog post on technology (an 
intricate sidebar of related blogs that comes up when you click on any of the issues) suggests that 
the idea of ―an internet kill switch‖ similar to the events in Egypt in early 2011 when the 
Egyptian government barred Egypt‘s access to the internet, is a possible reality with the United 
States.  An internet kill switch in the United States, the blog reads, ―Could be used to suppress 
the speech and freedom of assembly of the very people the Kill Switch legislation supposedly 
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protects.‖
54
 FreedomWorks also condemns political regulation of the internet, calling 
―unlawful…ineffective and detrimental to the free market.‖
55
 
In addition to the ―About‖ page, FreedomWorks offers an impressive list of other ―issue 
analyses‖, ―top ten‖ lists, a social networking site called ―Freedom Connecter‖ which allows 
members to find activists within their individual districts and zip code.  The website is 
significantly wired to social media like Twitter, Facebook, MySpace, Digg, and Yahoo, 
suggesting that new media is a central component to the success and dissemination of 
FreedomWorks rhetoric.  Key words of Freedom, Liberty, combined with the intricate and 
smooth new media platform suggests a correlation between those values and the wired new 
media positionality of the website.  Everything you read or click at the FreedomWorks website 
can be linked to a social media platform.  Shelly Goode, blogger at FreedomWorks, writing 
about her experiences at the Conservative Political Action Conference, or CPAC, an annual 
political conference attended by top conservative activists from around the country, suggests that 
the need to ―catch up‖ to the new media ecologies of the left is a thing of the past: ―We have 
finally caught up to the left‘s ability to harness New Media,‖ she writes.  ―This fact confirmed 
my theory and provided me with a new hope for the future of freedom; we will win because we 
have mastered New Media.‖
56
 
What makes FreedomWorks valuable in terms of studying Tea Party new media 
engagement is the close, if not ambiguous relationship between the movement and the 
foundation.  The early protests in Seattle and other scattered protests around the country did not 
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become unified around a ―Tea Party‖ theme until the Santelli ―rant‖ and the massive 
mobilization efforts of FreedomWorks took effect.  Paul Krugman wrote in the onset of the Tea 
Party protests that the ―tea parties don‘t represent a spontaneous outpouring of public sentiment. 
They‘re AstroTurf (fake grass roots) events, manufactured by the usual suspects. In particular, a 
key role is being played by FreedomWorks, an organization run by Richard Armey, the former 
House majority leader, and supported by the usual group of right-wing billionaires. And the 
parties are, of course, being promoted heavily by Fox News.‖
57
 However, Jon Henke, founding 
editor of The Next Right, a political strategy and new media activism site for conservative 
bloggers, argues instead that what FreedomWorks and various other organizations are doing is 
not "Astroturf any more than the anti-war protests of some years back were Astroturf because 
ANSWER and Moveon.org helped organize people around those events.  Astroturfing is paid 
activism by an organization; it is not genuine grassroots activism that funded groups are simply 
helping to organize.‖
58
  Indeed, there is much to the relationship between FreedomWorks and 
Tea Party Patriots, and whether or not the Tea Party movement is actually ―AstroTurf‖ is 
perhaps beyond the scope of this chapter.  I present the arguments here rather to show the close 
linkage between the two and the new media practices prevalent in each organization in relation 
to Tea Party causes. 
The connection between the conference calls, blogs, social media, ―digital activism‖ and 
online distribution of ―talking points‖ and ―issues‖ along with opportunities within a national 
umbrella to connect with local activists indicates a specific attitude toward new media.  Meckler, 
of Tea Party Patriots, considers the tactics of the conference calls and other new media practices 
as ―crowd sourcing‖ and ―open-source politics‖ in which the ―code‖ (Santelli‘s rant being the 
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―source code‖) can be modified by anyone to push the movement forward.  Jonathan Rauch has 
called this type of organization ―hivelike,‖ and a deliberate intention to ―rewrite the rule book for 
political organizing.‖ Describing the Tea Party as a decentralized network, run out of living 
rooms and laptops, coordinated through horizontal networks rather than hierarchical structures,  
Rauch suggests that the Tea Party understands their movement much like the internet: ―radically 
decentralized networks—everything from illicit music-sharing systems to Wikipedia—can direct 
resources and adapt (―mutate‖) far faster than corporations can.‖
59
 This form of organization is 
nothing new, and actually resembles tactics of the left historically, more than the right, except 
now the discourse is being created online which make the movement function on a much larger 
scale.
60
 The goal of the Tea Party, Rauch asserts, then, is more than just the ambitions of 
changing political seats and ousting incumbents.  ―No, the real point is to change the country's 
political culture, bending it back toward the self-reliant, liberty-guarding instincts of the 
Founders' era. Winning key congressional seats won't do that, nor will endorsing candidates.‖
61
 
 While Rauch is more optimistic about the limited scope and horizontal organizing of the 
Tea Party movement, as the relationship with FreedomWorks, FOX News (as Zerniki and Lapore 
highlight), and extremely influential and wealthy backers illustrate, it is nevertheless clear that 
new media organization is a crucial element of the Tea Party movement.  Tea Party Patriots use 
of social networking, Tea Party Express‘s use of YouTube, and the convergence of ―spreadable 
media,‖ and FreedomWorks’ heavy emphasis on blogs and Facebook—all show a heavy reliance 
and a narrative about technology that reflects a prevailing attitude that technology is synonymous 
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with liberty.  This is explicitly clear in FreedomWorks online rhetoric, and implicitly evident in 
Tea Party Patriots. However, Tea Party Express, with its heavy focus on top-down organization 
and its straight-line advocacy/political action mission, has less of a new media influence at the 
grassroots level and more of a influence from the vantage point of the top, such that money and 
media ―trickle down‖ to influence its members, which causes concern and even distaste among 
other Tea Party groups.  However, Tea Party Express nevertheless exhibits a tactical and 
philosophical approach to new media‘s vital role in political mobilization.   
At any rate, it seems each group understands that the political ―battle‖ cannot be won 
without successful utilization of new media, as each organization would indicate.  But the 
complex relationship between grassroots activism, corporate influence and the mass media is not 
to be ignored in ―winning the battle‖ either.  The Tea Party websites show how the Tea Party 
constitutes itself as a movement situated between mass media and the ―projects of the nation 
state,‖ which manifests itself in interesting ways, from the group in-fighting to the tactics of 
mobilization and the spreading of information, to the social networking opportunities.
62
 And if 
utilization of new media is indicative of more ―freedom‖ and ―liberty,‖ does it indeed contribute 
to a better ―democracy,‖ as the Tea Party sites would indicate?  The next chapter addresses this 
question through a theoretical construct of an effective democracy, the public sphere, to analyze 
these claims.
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Chapter 3: The Tea Party, New Media, and the Public Sphere 
At the heart of any sort of reflection on ―the public sphere‖ is the distinction between the 
public and the private.  The two constructions are intrinsically linked to one another, and their 
rise and continued development throughout the modern era are foundational to the rise of 
democracy.  As Craig Calhoun has noted, the distinction between the private lives of individuals 
and the various types of communications that link a connected ―public‖ have a profound impact 
on society.  The stakes, as Calhoun mentions, are not just academic but reveal insights into social 
movements, legal arguments, healthcare, surveillance, the media, and the nature of 
communication in general.  Discussing who can (or should) benefit from public goods or who is 
included in a ―public‖ debate or how a sense of ―privacy‖ is invaded—all include a tacit 
distinction between what is considered public and what is considered private. Thus, envisioning 
a successful democracy through the metaphor of ―the public sphere,‖ which, as Calhoun writes, 
is ―shorthand for speaking about all these issues and their interconnections,‖ then the confusing 
and often contested nature of the ―public sphere‖ is valuable, especially in light of the 
relationship between Tea Party and their use of/rhetoric about new media.
1
  
One reason the Tea Party Movement a valuable scholarly project is how its web-based 
communication practices provide a critique of the public sphere.  When scholars theorize about 
the internet, they commonly laud its potential for fostering democracy, solidarity, and rational-
critical debate among a public that is political but separate from the state—in other words, that 
the internet is a helpful tool for realizing the ideal vision of a public sphere.  However, 
discussion on the internet can also lead to greater social fragmentation and partisanship, 
impeding a democratic public sphere from flourishing in a truly open space.  The online Tea 
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Party groups do not fit neatly anywhere into this spectrum, for one can argue that they function 
as an activist counterpublic reacting against the public sphere.  On the other hand, one can also 
argue that the reach of the Tea Party‘s influence has bled into the mainstream so profoundly as to 
alter elections, influence debates, and produce cultural tropes—staking a significant claim on the 
popular and political cultural landscape.  The media obviously has a hand in the Tea Party‘s 
ascent as well, reporting on every relevant Tweet, Facebook post, or protest organized by online 
Tea Party activists, which bolsters Tea Party coverage and support and challenges Tea Party 
rhetoric that depicts the mainstream media as unreliable and malicious. 
Thus my questions center on the capabilities of new media with regard to democratic 
exchange.  How does political communication in an online environment influence the public 
sphere?  And, by extension, how do the Tea Party‘s online activities contribute to this public 
sphere?  Is the Tea Party‘s form of online communication actually democratic, as their rhetoric 
and appraisal of new media would indicate?  This chapter summarizes ongoing conversations 
about the public sphere, a theory first introduced by Jurgen Habermas, with particular attention 
to how the Internet and the public sphere interact with one another.  I anchor my argument in the 
significant public sphere literature, addressing both the cyber-utopians, or rather, those who tout 
the internet as a harbinger of a new era in democracy, as well as the critics of online 
communication.  Taking the strains of literature into account, I argue that while many studies on 
political communication and new media stress progressive, liberal online movements to argue for 
enhanced democracy online, the online makeup of the Tea Party movement complicates 
traditional, more optimistic assessments of the internet and the public sphere.  Moreover, while 
the metaphor of a public sphere is a useful goal for a democratic society, much of the 
communication online, with the Tea Party as a specific example, reflects social fragmentation 
70 
 
and ―digital islands‖ of communication, a reality that challenges readings of the inherently 
democratic nature of new media, which I call a form of technological determinism.  
 The term ―public sphere‖ was popularized by historian Jurgen Habermas to describe a 
domain of society in which citizens unrelated to the nation state came together under a banner of 
common interests to deliberate political matters.  In the influential study The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas traces the rise and fall of public opinion in early 
modern Europe in which new ―publics‖ communicated their common interests to the state 
through ―forms of legally guaranteed free speech, free press, and free assembly, and eventually 
through the parliamentary institutions of representative government.‖ The public sphere emerged 
in early modern Europe as an ―arena,‖ or a discursive realm in which private citizens came 
together to form a public and engage in an ―ideal of unrestricted rational discussion of public 
matters.‖
2
  The public sphere declined, Habermas contends, when it became ―the court before 
which public prestige can be displayed—rather than in which critical debate is carried on.‖
3
 In 
other words, throughout the 20
th
 century, the rise of mass media negatively affected the public 
sphere in such a way as to stifle critical debate in favor of ―public prestige.‖  ―Vertical‖ 
communication between mass media and various institutions gradually subsumed ―horizontal‖ 
communication between publics across networks, such that ―the space for participatory 
communication [was] severely constricted.‖ This foundational theory underscores the value of 
democratic public spaces as checks upon institutional power.
 4
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 However, Habermas‘s theory was subject to extensive critique and criticism.
5
 Nancy 
Fraser points out the inherent exclusions of Habermas‘s romanticized version of the public 
sphere, noting the contemporaneous existence of several competing publics: ―the bourgeois 
public was never the public,‖ she writes.  ―On the contrary, virtually contemporaneous with the 
bourgeois public there arose a host of competing counterpublics, including nationalist publics, 
popular peasant publics, and working class publics.‖  The existence of alternative public spheres, 
moreover, ―contested the exclusionary norms of the bourgeois public, elaborating alternative 
styles of political behavior and alternative norms of public speech.‖
6
 In questioning the notion of 
a homogenous, classless public sphere, Fraser casts light onto ―counterpublics‖ that invent new 
language and counter-discourses to reconceptualize specific needs of minority identities.  For 
example, Fraser highlights the ―late U.S. feminist subaltern counterpublic, with its variegated 
array of journals, bookstores, publishing companies, film and video distribution networks, 
lecture series, research centers, academic programs, conferences, conventions, festivals, and 
local meeting places,‖ to show how a counter public sphere recasts the needs of the ―public‖ to 
question bourgeois assumptions.
7
 Multiple publics, then, are preferable to one comprehensive 
notion of a public sphere, since participating in a public sphere is at once a political proposition 
as well as an expression of cultural identity, and ―filtering diverse rhetoric and stylistic norms 
through a single, overarching lens‖ would privilege one group over another, diminishing social 
equality.
8
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 Michael Warner pushes Fraser‘s argument further by suggesting that feminist 
counterpublics are not just ―counter‖ in that their circulation of discourse is oppositional to 
dominant public discourse.  Rather, Warner writes that feminist counterpublics are distinguished 
by more than just ―its program of reform.‖  Counterpublics are ―counter‖ also in their 
―awareness of [their] subordinate status,‖ with specific codes and forms of address that are 
―socially marked by their participation in this kind of discourse; ordinary people are presumed to 
not want to be mistaken for the kind of person who would participate in this kind of talk or be 
present in this kind of scene.‖  Warner highlights the rise of a queer counterpublic as an example 
of a discourse that is not merely reformatory in nature; rather, it is a counterpublic also because 
―its participants are addressed in a counterpublic way.‖  Warner‘s version of counterpublics is 
important because it suggests counterpublics as not only oppositional but also as imagining 
different subjectivities in the way they constitute and fashion themselves in terms of ―discursive 
circulation as strangers as a social entity.‖ In this way counterpublics are spaces in which their 
meaning-making is ―transformative, not replicative merely.‖
9
 
 With the advent of the Internet and online communication technologies, the relevance of 
counterpublicity with regard to political communication and the formation of new subjective 
experiences are even more prescient. The existence of other counterpublic spheres complicates 
the notion that there was one monolithic lens through which the ―public‖ formed opinions, and 
moreover invites the inclusion of the Internet into the conversation, due to the Internet‘s 
commonly regarded ―alternative‖ forms, and because, as Peter Dahlgren suggests, the Internet is 
where we find ―the real vanguard of the public sphere, the domain where the most intense 
developments are taking place—what we might call the cyber-transformation of the public 
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sphere.‖
 10
  For instance, in her study of nearly 300 political discussion groups on the internet, 
Zizi Papacharissi found that conversations online are mostly civil (while not necessarily polite), 
and moreover, ―newsgroup postings resemble the political discussions that take place among 
friends in pubs or coffeehouses,‖ which resembles the public sphere frame put forth by 
Habermas.  However, political discussion online often took on very specific topics, which aligns 
with Fraser‘s conception of multiple coexisting counter-public spheres. Papacharissi writes: 
―These newsgroups form several mini-public spheres that are not equally powerful, and serve to 
articulate diverse collective interests and concerns.‖
11
  
  Dahlgren addresses whether these alternative online forms of political communication 
can interfere with the dominant public sphere to inspire critical debate by highlighting two 
distinct and overlapping domains of the public sphere: the ―advocacy‖ domain the ―common‖ 
domain.
12
 John Downey and Natalie Fenton incorporate this conceptualization of the online 
public sphere to suggest that the way in which the public sphere interacts with other 
counterpublic spheres is integral to understanding ―the relationship between media representation 
and social change.‖  They note that by separating the public sphere into the domains of a general, 
universalized ―public,‖ and an ―advocacy‖ sector that uses the dominant media comprised of 
―interest groups, movements, organizations and networks,‖ the public sphere can be considered 
more in terms of ―the dominators‖ and ―also the public sphere of the dominated.‖
13
 Downey and 
Fenton discuss how the two spheres interact and overlap to understand how counter-publicity 
can, under the right circumstances, ―break through‖ into the common domain.
14
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As discussed in chapter 2, The Tea Party Movement‘s digital genesis is a unique aspect 
of the movement, which reveals new and important insights into notions of the public sphere.  
Dahlgren, incorporating Habermas‘s concept of the public sphere, extrapolates the role of online 
political discussion in the creation and sustenance of democracy.  When discussing online public 
spheres, Dahlgren notes the ―impressive communicative heterogeneity‖ in the Internet‘s 
contribution to the public sphere containing multiple voices of agency, but notes the possibility 
of fragmentation and public spheres veering off toward ―islands of political communication,‖ 
which arises from the ―mushrooming of advocacy groups and the array of issues available.‖  He 
continues: ―While traditional online party politics and forms of e-government may serve as 
centripetal forces to such fragmentation, the trend is clearly in the direction of increasing 
dispersion.‖
15
 In the context of what he calls the ―destabilization‖ of political communication in 
late modern societies, within particular activist/advocacy domains of online public spheres, there 
is, he writes, ―modest potential for making a contribution to the renewal, growth, and 
strengthening of civic cultures among many citizens who feel distanced from the arenas of 
formal party politics.‖  Dahlgren does admit, however, that citizens engaged in civil activities 
online are complex and nuanced, and due to the ―wide variety of political colors in this sector,‖ 
not all activists and groups should ―be considered democratic and progressive.‖
16
  Dahlgren‘s 
conclusion is optimistic, yet cautious: ―The values and commitments espoused by these groups 
are largely very democratic,‖ he writes:  
And can be seen as a counter to some of the very undemocratic values associated with the 
prevailing neo-liberal order. They are able to diffuse their knowledge through the Net to 
each other, and on occasion their efforts are picked up by journalists on the Net or in the 
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traditional mass media and become disseminated further to wider publics…The affinities 
demonstrated by many of these groups foster a spirit of cooperation between various 
organizations and their loosely defined memberships, contributing to the formation of a 
broader counter political culture…Via the identities that are developed by participation, 
people are exploring new ways of being citizens and doing politics.‖
17
   
The contemporary Tea Party movement both aligns with and complicates Dahlgren‘s assessment 
of civic engagement in an online public sphere.  What began as an advocacy group, the Tea Party 
represents Dahlgren‘s assessment of a fragmented political island of communication comprised 
citizens who feel unrepresented or ―distanced from the arenas of formal party politics,‖ but 
nevertheless, their influence has broken through, so to speak, from the advocacy domain into 
something resembling a broader political culture. The Tea Party sees itself as a counter public, 
providing frequent protestations to ―get our voice heard‖ and other tropes that indicate a 
perceived subaltern status.  For instance, a local Tea Party Patriots affiliate in Rhode Island 
advertises in its ―About Us‖ section that their voices will ―be heard‖ when raised in unision: 
―Nothing less than the futures of Rhode Island and America is at Stake.  We are Americans.  We 
have a rich history full of strength and resolve.  Improvise, adapt, and overcome!‖
18
 Here, in 
addition to the populist tropes mentioned in Chapter 1, is an implicit identification with a public 
unrepresented, disenfranchised, and in need of the ―strength‖ to ―overcome‖ the oppression of 
the current political climate. 
 However, the Tea Party has a significant influence and massive political presence, 
partially due to social media websites and their use of new media communication technologies.  
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Digital media is a fundamental component of their organizational strategies.  The real question, 
though, focuses on the significance of their new media use with regard to the public sphere.  Are 
Tea Party members actually creating and sustaining an alternative public sphere? Or are they 
replicating the dominant discourse in American political communication—the status quo—in the 
guise of dissent and revolution against tyranny?  Part of the massive success and influence of the 
Tea Party, especially in the midterm elections of 2010, was in their ability to ―[connect] local 
groups to the national conversation,‖ and as noted in Chapter 2, social media usage and well-
funded organizations like FreedomWorks and Tea Party Express offer websites and training 
seminars for the usage of social media in more ―effective‖ grassroots activism.
19
 And, as 
Dahlgren optimistically notes above, sometimes online discussion can foster cooperation across 
groups and contribute to a broader alternative political culture.  But there is a difference between 
the ―small but determined groups‖ Dahlgren mentions when discussing the grassroots activism 
tactics of the Civil Rights Movement with the civic engagement practices of the Tea Party.  The 
Tea Party incorporates much of the rhetoric of Civil Rights both on and offline in an effort to 
bolster support of their base as well as to appeal to those who understand the current state of 
America as one in turmoil, its leadership oppressive, and the republic in need of restoration and 
reclamation.
20
 This suggests that the ease with which political rhetoric can spread and influence 
others due to social media tactics may be detrimental to democracy, even in the guise of it.
21
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Skeptical of the notion that coexisting counterpublic spheres can enhance democracy, 
Downey and Fenton cite Habermas‘s similar doubts as to whether or not these technologies 
could function as an expansion of an inclusive public sphere, writing that the growth of new 
information and communication technology contributes to the ―fragmentation of civil society, as 
well as political mobilization and participation.‖ Moreover, they write that ―greater pluralism,‖ 
or rather, multiple and competing voices of dissent in the public sphere, ―may be regarded as a 
risk for deliberative democracy rather than its savior.‖
22
 Another important part of Downey and 
Fenton‘s argument is that when considering the advocacy domains of the public sphere and their 
potential for democracy and civic engagement, ―it is important not to fall prey to a Left cultural 
romanticism that sees all forms of grassroots cultural expression as ―resistance.‖
23
 The existence 
of multiple and competing counterpublics, for Downey and Fenton, does not necessarily mean 
enhanced democracy and greater corporation across ideologies.  ―Unless powerful alliances are 
made,‖ they write, ―the oppositional energy of individual groups and subcultures is more often 
neutralized in the marketplace of multicultural pluralism, or polarized in a reductive competition 
of victimizations.‖
24
 
Read in this way, much of the rhetoric used on Tea Party websites is ―neutralized‖ in its 
oppositionality and resistance to critical/rational debate.  For instance, in the ―Frequently Asked 
Questions‖ section of the Tea Party Nation, a for profit company that also hosts a social 
networking site for its members, states: ―Tea Party Nation is for principled, patriotic debate and 
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organization against liberal ideology and agenda. It is not a forum for personal attacks, lewd or 
profane language, racism, bigotry, anti-Semitism or calls for militant uprisings or for the 
formation of a third party.‖ Rhetorically, the Tea Party Nation rules call for ―debate‖ and 
exchange on the issues that refrain from rhetoric reinforcing racism and other types of speech 
that may stifle rational/critical debate.  However, further down the paragraph, the rules get more 
specific:  ―Tea Party Nation exists largely for the discussion and dissemination of our goals, as 
stated above. Extensive use of non-English may be viewed as exclusionary, an attempt to subvert 
or divert such open discussion, and may be dealt with summarily.‖  While publically decrying 
racism, the debate rules on the Tea Party Nation forum call for the use of English as the primary 
language of communication, while any alternative languages are viewed as ―exclusionary‖ or 
―subversive.‖  Moreover, the end of the section includes a note addressed to what they label 
―liberal trolls‖ (―troll‖ is internet jargon for one who posts instigative comments on message 
boards or blogs to provoke dissent, disruptions, and mischief): 
Note to Prospective Liberal Trolls: TPN does not tolerate liberal trolls. If your sole 
purpose is to join this site in order to disrupt the flow of constructive dialogue against 
liberalism, you will find your time here very short. You can and will be banned for being 
a liberal. If you wish to debate the virtues of liberalism (as though there were such a 
thing), there are many other sites on the web who will tolerate you. TPN is not one of 
those sites (emphasis added) 
Tea Party Nation makes it very clear that they are there to debate issues only upon which they 
agree, issues categorized specifically within their ideological boundaries, which fall somewhere 
between ―God given Individual Freedoms written out by the Founding Fathers…Limited 
Government, Free Speech, the Second Amendment, our Military, Secure Borders and our 
79 
 
Country.‖ Read in a certain way, indeed the Tea Party Nation is resisting something, but is it 
power? The very rules of debate by which the Tea Party Nation operate function not as a 
―discussion‖ or a space for enhancing a ―principled, patriotic debate,‖ among a diverse public, 
but rather in terms of what Dahlgren describes as an ―island of political communication‖ that 
contributes instead to fragmentation, isolation, and nativism.
 25
 
Other scholars fall into the trap that Downey and Fenton describe of characterizing new 
media in in terms of fostering more progressive political movements of resistance to dominant 
society.  For instance, Richard Kahn and Douglas Kellner highlight the internet activism of the 
famous ―Battle for Seattle‖ protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 
of 1999.  The internet, they write, fostered ―an international protest movement…in resistance to 
neoliberal institutions and their related globalization policies, while democracy, social justice, 
and a better world were championed.‖  Thus, there are profound implications in using the 
internet in this way, they write, which give rise to increased democracy and emancipation by the 
hands of ―a growing planetary citizenry that is using the new media to become informed, to 
inform others, and to construct new social and political relations.‖
26
 Kahn and Kellner consider 
―cyberactivism‖ to be the new front of resistance to global capitalism—and the increasing 
permeability of communications technologies is creating ―highly informed, autonomous 
communities,‖ linking people in such a way as to provide the possibility for ―a new politics of 
alliance and solidarity to overcome the limitations of postmodern identity politics.‖
27
 While 
acknowledging that the internet is indeed a contested space where many dissonant voices mingle 
and serve their own interests (especially in a capitalist society that favors individualism, 
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competition, and corporate interests), Kellner and Kahn nevertheless understand new 
communications technologies as a revolution in political mobilization that ―constitute[s] a 
dramatic transformation of everyday life that is presently being constructed and enacted by 
internet subcultures.‖
28
  
 Kahn and Kellner are not the only scholars who have suggested that the internet is the 
harbinger of more horizontal networks with an inherent tendency to democratize power, bring 
about new forms of democratic discussion, and organize progressive activists into coalitions that 
successfully resist the crushing forces of global capitalism.
29
  However, throughout many of the 
discussions on the democratic potential of new media and new communications technologies, 
there tends to be an over-emphasis on the many examples of progressive social movements that 
have effectively used the internet to organize campaigns in favor of social justice or left-leaning 
political agendas.
30
  While these examples are important in assessing the ways in which 
progressive forms of online alternative media can empower grassroots movements and other 
social groups, there seems to be a disconnect: Indeed, the internet can foster communities that 
enhance the possibility of activism and agency where, combined across communities, there lies 
―a potentially loud, booming voice.‖
31
 But there is less of a gaze on the other end of the political 
spectrum, even though conservative political movements, as mentioned before, are mobilizing 
with online social media and Web 2.0 technologies in far greater numbers than perceived 
―liberal‖ democrats.  What might we make of the liberatory rhetoric of new media technology 
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and the increased possibility of more ―critical-rational debate‖ when it is employed by anti-
progressive, hyper-individualistic political movements?   
On the one hand the Internet can provide opportunities for many counterpublics to 
engage in political communication in the form of protest or mobilization, as the ―internet offers 
them a way not only of communicating with supporters, but also the potential to reach out 
beyond the ―radical ghetto‖ both directly…and indirectly, through influencing the mass 
media.‖
32
 But, a key question is the role that politically counterpublic websites play in fostering 
support of their radical political opinions beyond their own ―political island,‖ and whether or not 
this counter sphere can achieve more publicity through the mass media, regardless if the 
coverage is overwhelmingly positive or negative. Following Habermas‘s vision and revision of 
the public sphere, Downey and Fenton suggest that: 
The mass-media public sphere will become more open to radical opinion as a result of the 
coincidence of societal crises and the growth of virtual counter-public spheres.  This 
should be understood as a self-reinforcing process that will lead, in turn, to greater 
counter-public sphere activity.  This may further lead to an examination of the 
relationship between shifts in counter-public spheres, the mass-media public sphere and 
societal change.  In the early 1990s, Habermas tended to foreground the ―positive‖ 
aspects of this process (for example, the impact of environmental groups on critical-
rational debate in the public sphere), but it is now abundantly clear that the instability of 
the public sphere can also be exploited by the extreme Right.
 33
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Downey and Fenton‘s hypothesis that the instability of the public sphere can be exploited 
by the extreme Right simultaneously with progressive, inclusive democratic exchanges, is useful 
when understanding the Tea Party Movement‘s media engagement.  Read as an oppositional 
counter-public sphere, indeed the Tea Party facilitates solidarity among people who identify 
specifically with their ideology.  The Tea Party‘s vocal opposition to the mainstream media 
reinforces the notion of a counter-public fighting the status quo and reinvigorating the public 
sphere.  But as James McPherson argues, though criticism of the ―liberal media‖ by 
conservatives has been around for a long time, the mainstream media has actually drifted more to 
the right since the 1960s.  The changes in journalism and mass media since the 1960s, 
McPherson argues, allowed conservatives more than liberals to benefit the most, especially in the 
realm of talk radio, direct mail, and other methods that reinvigorated a conservative base and, 
through aggressive media tactics, persuaded mainstream journalists to adopt more of the 
conventions of the conservative media:  ―Even without trying to analyze the biases of individual 
journalists or their messages, some obvious tendencies have emerged,‖ McPherson writes.  
―Though those tendencies do not necessarily correspond to overt partisan biases, in most cases 
they do reflect a broader kind of conservative bias—a reflection that shows American journalism 
to be wary of change or those who promote change, while promoting a pro-business, pro-
community, pro-status quo, pro-American perspective.‖
 34
 Moreover, ―partly because 
conservatives have unceasingly criticized the supposed liberalism of the press, in some respects 
the American news media probably now cover politics worse—less correctly or less ―right‖—
than they once did.‖
35
   Conservative media, McPherson argues, is more about reacting to issues 
and topics that subvert the status quo, rather than striving to change the status quo:  ―The 
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―middle‖ on the spectrum of American political thought shifts from time to time to the left and to 
the right, but the mainstream media, despite claims of objectivity has generally leaned to a more 
―reactive‖ or conservative bent.‖
36
 A right-leaning mainstream press, in other words, aids rather 
than opposes Tea Party resentment, and the rhetoric exhibited on Tea Party websites reveals 
more exclusive rather than inclusive parameters, exposing an unstable public sphere made more 
isolated and more fragmented through the new media practices of the Tea Party Movement.  
Moreover, new media are not solely or causally responsible for the creation of counter public 
spheres.  But, through ―contributing to the destabilization of the public sphere and the generation 
of new forms of fragmentation and solidarity,‖ new media are crucial in this conversation.  This 
―presents both opportunities and dangers to the theory and practice of democracy.‖
37
 
Downey and Fenton make an important contribution in their analysis of Right-Wing 
conservative websites in the destabilization of the public sphere, highlighting how digital 
communication technology can be both enabling and stifling, or as they say, dangerous, to 
democratic exchange. While Dahlgren and others are right to point out that digital 
communication technologies signal a new way of doing citizenship, perhaps it is important to 
remember the somber, if not pessimistic contention by Evgeny Morozov that digital technologies 
can just as easily enable dictators, dominators, and extremists of all camps to suppress 
democracy and dominate others. Particularly concerning mobilization for social reform, it is 
incorrect, he writes,  
to assess the political power of the Internet solely based on its contribution to social 
mobilization: We should also consider how it empowers the government via surveillance, 
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how it disempowers citizens via entertainment, how it transforms the nature of dissent by 
shifting it into a more virtual realm, how it enables governments to produce better and 
more effective propaganda, and so forth…The point here is that while the Internet could 
make the next revolution more effective, it could also make it less likely.
38
   
To be fair, the Tea Party‘s online presence is nothing like the oppressive new media tactics of the 
Iranian or Egyptian government to which Morozov eludes.  However, what Morozov reveals is 
that just as new media can be utilized for more effective democratic engagement, especially 
under the parameters that Dahlgren or Downey and Fenton outline, those very same tactics can 
just as easily function as fragmentary, destabilizing, isolationist, and contrary to fostering a more 
democratic public sphere. 
For instance, in an ―online activism‖ seminar hosted by influential Tea Party affiliate The 
American Majority, a speaker instructs a group of potential Tea Party activists in a slightly 
different mode of what he calls ―digital activism.‖  ―We‘re going to go on this tour called the 
American Liberty tour where we go to 18 cities, we hold presentations like this, educational 
seminars, we do blogger breakfasts where we connect bloggers in the cities and we then hold 
liberty rallies at night to get people fired up‖ the speaker says.  But, in addition to firing up the 
potential ―digital activists‖ the trainer also instructs the group in what he calls a ―Guerilla‖ style 
internet activism, connecting what the Tea Party is trying to do to the American Revolution. 
―Over 200 years ago, guys, a group of people just like you did something extraordinary, ordinary 
people doing extraordinary things,‖ he says.  ―They were activists just like you, I truly believe 
that.  They were activists then, we are activists now.  Make no distinction about it.‖  The key part 
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of being digital activists for the Tea Party, he says, is that ―we identify the medium, we learn the 
medium, we manipulate the medium.  It was printing presses then, it‘s the internet now.  That‘s 
where we influence the hearts and minds of our fellow citizens.  The Tea Party‘s got us running 
up the hills, the American Majority’s trying to give you the tools, the muskets.‖  After 
legitimizing the cause, the American Majority activism trainer gives tips on how to ―spread‖ the 
ideals and influence of the Tea Party most effectively online, while behind him sits a power-
point slide of Uncle Sam, underneath it the caption: ―I want you for Blogosphere‖: 
So here‘s what I do. I get on Amazon, and I type in ―liberal books.‖ I go through and I 
say, ―1 star, 1 star, 1 star—the flipside is you go to [conservative and libertarian] products 
and you give them 5 stars.  So literally 80% of the books I put a star on, I don‘t 
read…this is where your kids are getting information: ―Rotten Tomatoes,‖ ―Flickster,‖ 
those are places where you can rate movies, so when you type in movies on healthcare or 
documentaries on healthcare, I don‘t want ―Sicko‖ to come up.  I don‘t want Michael 
Moore to come up, so I give it bad ratings…if there is a place to comment, a place to rate, 
a place to share information, you have to do it, that‘s how you control the online 
dialogue, give our ideals a fighting chance.‖
39
 
An important part about this seminar is the notion of connecting their brand of activism to that of 
those engaged in the American Revolution themselves, a notion historian Jill Lapore has labeled 
―anti-history‖ and ―presentism‖— conflating founding documents and historical events with a 
sort of religious fundamentalism.
40
 Another important aspect of the seminar is the notion that 
―spreading influence‖ and giving Tea Party ideals ―a fighting chance‖ involves suppressing 
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debate, digitally ―burying‖ progressive or liberal online content on ranking-sites like ―Amazon‖ 
or ―Rotten Tomatoes‖ in favor of more conservative content.
41
 While far from the oppressive 
tactics of the Egyptian government (in cutting off the internet to its citizens entirely), what this 
does is confirm Morozov‘s skepticism toward new media as an inherently democratic tool—and 
Guerilla activism is nevertheless a far cry from enabling a more effective public sphere.   
But perhaps the model of the ―public sphere‖ is inadequate.  In describing civic 
engagement in a digital age, Zizi Papacharissi concludes that the conventional metaphor of the 
public sphere, a domain of civic engagement through rational, political discourse in a public 
setting, may not be sufficient for the changing modes of civic engagement in an era of 
convergent digital technologies.  Rather, Papacharissi proposes a ―new civic vernacular‖ that 
takes into account digitally convergent technologies that are articulated in tropes ―distinct from 
the deliberative model of the public sphere.‖
42
 Papacharissi argues that ―digitally enabled 
citizens‖ engage in civic behavior that originates in what she calls the private sphere, and then 
can be ―broadcast publically to multiple and select audiences of the citizen‘s choosing and at the 
citizen‘s whim.‖
43
 For instance, Tea Party blogs, social networking, Tea Party Nation discussion 
boards, or even the ―digital activism‖ tactics of the American Majority all originate within the 
private sphere, she writes.  Far from representing civic apathy or a disengagement from political 
discourse, engagement with digital technology in a private sphere ―represents an expression of 
dissent with a public agenda, determined by mainstream media and political actors.  It stands as a 
private, digitally enabled, intrusion on a public agenda determined by others.‖
44
 In a democracy, 
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which Papacharissi writes is a sort of middle-ground among notions of public and private, the 
private sphere is ―the locus from which individuals negotiate their relationship with the status 
quo of democracy.‖ Moreover, she writes, digitally networked citizens feel ―more powerful‖ 
negotiating selfhood and citizenship from the private sphere, and she describes this as a political 
act of dissent.
45
 In this sense, Tea Party digital activists are indeed negotiating selfhood and 
citizenship form the private sphere, dissenting against a ―public agenda.‖ 
But just because an act is political does not make it necessarily democratic.  Papacharissi 
argues that the migration into the private sphere made possible by convergent technologies does 
not facilitate an active and democratic public sphere.  ―Online digital technologies create a public 
space,‖ she writes, ―but do not inevitably enable a public sphere.‖ Papacharissi notes that there 
are three conditions that prohibit digital technologies from being described as a public sphere in 
the traditional sense: access to information, reciprocity of communication, and 
commercialization.
46
 In this way, online digital technologies are not inherently democratic, but 
―relatively powerless in conventional representative democratic environments, networked 
citizens claim their power through autonomously exerted acts of expression and connection.‖ 
Though internet communication technologies enable connections with people of like-minded 
inclinations, as in the Tea Party social networking sites that even forbid other political 
viewpoints from participating, Papacharissi writes that these sort of civic connections are not 
prescriptive.  In her closing chapter, she concludes ―far form a recipe for democracy, the private 
sphere is an attempt at a new space and a new sociality.‖
47
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The Tea Party‘s use of new media technology in terms of framing online debate and 
engaging in digital activism present several problems to traditional interpretations of new 
media‘s role in sustaining democracy and yielding a more lively and effective public sphere.  
There is an expectation of new media communication technologies, Gerhards and Schafer write, 
that the Internet can make a better public sphere, where ―alternative evaluations and 
interpretations will be presented online, and that the information available will be more 
differentiated on the internet. In the long run, they write, ―the internet might democratize the 
public sphere and lead to strengthened political interest and participation among citizens.‖
48
 
Taking these expectations into account, Gerhards and Schafer compared the models of both the 
―old media‖ and ―internet based‖ public spheres to empirically evaluate if the Internet is ―better‖ 
than print media, ―in the sense that it better corresponds to the demands of the participatory 
model.‖  Their results are intriguing.  They find little evidence that the internet is any better of a 
communication space than print media, and moreover, ―internet communication seemed even 
more one-sided and less inclusive than print media communication.‖ Search engines favor 
institutional actors who are larger and better funded, thereby receiving a higher ranking on 
Google searches and more space for debate than smaller public spheres.  ―This manner of actor 
and content selection,‖ they write, ―might be even inferior compared to the old (and already 
often criticized) mass media, because the latter at least employ journalistic norms like balanced 
reporting and neutrality when selecting actors and statements, and thereby presenting a possibly 
better communication than the internet.‖
49
 This empirical study is important when reflecting on 
the Tea Party‘s influence on the public sphere. For one, cyber-utopian rhetoric, as seen within the 
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Tea Party‘s media ecology, frames the Internet as a space where otherwise voiceless and 
disgruntled political dissidents now have a voice to speak out and mobilize against a powerful 
and oppressive regime.  Framing Tea Party activism with the American Revolution, Liz Sidoti 
rejoices at how the "tea parties" formed in U.S. living rooms morphed into the latest political 
phenomenon so quickly after Obama took office,‖ calling it ―a testament to the power of the 
Internet and the changes in a country that's come to heavily rely on it.‖
50
 But as Gerhards and 
Schafter contend, the Internet leaves less room for political deliberation and debate, and while 
Tea Party activists indeed mobilize and communicate in greater numbers thanks to internet 
communication technologies, whether their communication is ―democracy in action‖ as the title 
of Sidoti‘s article contends, is questionable. 
Moreover, Papacharissi writes that civility is a requirement for democratic discourse: 
―Conversations on the meaning of citizenship, democracy, and public discourse highlight civility 
as a virtue, the lack of which carries detrimental implications for a democratic society.‖
51
 Tea 
Party Nation‘s website, however, in framing the rules for participation and debate, focus less on 
―political interest and participation among citizens‖ and more on debate that only fits into 
ideological boundaries upon which Tea Party members agree.  This sort of incivility is 
dangerous, Papacharissi writes, because while impoliteness in general is not uncivil or inhibitive 
of democracy—(it enhances it, in fact, she argues, citing Leotard‘s notion of ―democratic 
emancipation through disagreement and anarchy‖)—disregard for the collective nature of 
democracy does inhibit it.  ―It is when people demonstrate offensive behavior toward social 
groups,‖ she writes, ―that their behavior becomes undemocratic.‖  Papacharissi writes: 
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To borrow a term from the politeness literature, civility is positive collective face; that is, 
deference to the social and democratic identity of an individual. Incivility can be defined 
as negative collective face; that is, disrespect for the collective traditions of democracy. 
Civility can then be operationalized as the set of behaviors that threaten democracy, deny 
people their personal freedoms, and stereotype social groups.
52
 
The examples of the online rhetoric, images, and tactics of Tea Party websites exhibit these 
forms of incivility, whether restricting debate from non-English speakers and ―liberals,‖ or 
engaging in ―digital activism‖ that effectively censors opposing viewpoints while inflating their 
own.  This runs counter to consistent rhetoric that stresses the democratic and liberatory qualities 
of new media, reinforced by a handful of ―cyber utopians,‖ mass media that covers the Tea Party 
and, Tea Party members themselves. 
 Fitting the Tea Party into the conversations about democracy, technology, and the public 
sphere is difficult.  Matt Lilla writes that the Tea Party as a movement appeals to a rhetoric of 
individualism: the Tea Party ―fires up emotions by appealing to individual opinion, individual 
autonomy, and individual choice, all in the service of neutralizing, not using, political power. It 
gives voice to those who feel they are being bullied, but this voice has only one, Garbo-like thing 
to say: I want to be left alone.‖
53
  Moreover, political commentator Jonathan Hoenig, speaking at 
a Tax Day Tea Party Rally in 2009, articulated the Tea Party philosophy as one in opposition to 
―collectivism.‖ 
Collectivism holds that the individual has no rights. The product of your labor now 
belongs to the group! So, whatever they want, whether its mortgage rates healthcare, 
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green cars, green jobs and education, anything at all, it now becomes your responsibility 
to provide it whether you like it or not! You see it in the taxes, they take money from the 
people who earned it and give it to people who have not! We see it in the language, I 
mean all this talk of we‘re all in it together, I am my brother‘s keeper, shared sacrifice, it 
all speaks to the same idea: You are here to serve!...This is a profoundly un-American 
idea…in this country you are born free, not with the duty to serve the king but with the 
moral right to live your own life…you don‘t owe society a goddamned thing.
54
 
Many Tea Party members neglect the influence of society, focusing instead on ―radical 
individualism‖ and the rhetorical association of what Hoenig calls ―collectivism‖ with 
communism, fascism, and socialism.
 55
  This indicates a divergence from much of the literature 
that views the public sphere as a desired mode of communication where matters are discussed in 
a public way—where communication is deliberative, open to all, and transparent.
56
 Rather, the 
new media communication practices of the Tea Party seem to mimic not an alternative public 
sphere, or a counter public, but merely a replication of the dominant public sphere, a dissenting 
facet of status quo where ―several special interest publics coexist and flaunt their collective 
identities of dissent, thus reflecting the social dynamics of the real world.‖
57
 In other words, the 
Tea Party participates in some form of a ―virtual public sphere,‖ or ―culturally fragmented 
cyberspheres that occupy a common virtual public space.‖  And while it is true that ―the internet 
and related technologies have managed to create new public space for political discussion,‖ this 
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does not ensure civility, a revitalized and ideal public sphere, or a more informed, participatory 
culture. 
Just as Downey and Fenton call for alliances across online public spheres, the vision of 
the ―true‖ public sphere, or ―several spheres of counterpublics that have been excluded from 
mainstream political discourse, yet employ virtual communication to restructure the mainstream 
that ousted them‖ is nevertheless a vision instead of a reality.
58
 The various facets of the Tea 
Party media ecology exhibit this notion, and are a testament to the complex and unstable nature 
of extending the public sphere metaphor into the virtual realm.  As Schuler and Day write, 
―Since the concept of public sphere is abstract and imprecise, its best use may be as an indicator 
for direction and as a metric for criticism and action.‖  Therefore these observations and 
reflections on the Tea Party media engagement helps, to use the public sphere as a way ―to 
critique existing systems and imagine better ones.‖
59
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Conclusion: Contributions and Limitations 
The prevailing idea throughout this project is that associations of freedom and liberty 
with innovations in technology share a closely linked rhetorical legacy in the United States.  By 
looking at the Tea Party Movement in terms of its history, rhetoric, and new media ecologies, I 
argue that the Tea Party embodies a form of digital populism, utilizing populist rhetorical 
frameworks in an online environment to construct a narrative about the role of technology in 
society as liberatory, transformative, and essential to reaching and sustaining its rhetorical goals.  
First, by outlining a brief history to the study of populism, I argued for a definition of 
populism that incorporates two components: a rhetorical base and ideological range.  In this way, 
populism is better seen as a rhetorical strategy, a ―linguistic mode‖ subject to historical and 
cultural forces, but nevertheless situated along a spectrum of ideologies that range from 
progressive to reactionary.  This allows for a more holistic understanding of how populism both 
works rhetorically and institutionally.  Also, reflecting on the writings of Hofstadter and Wood, 
in light of Lapore‘s recent work on the Tea Party, I distanced myself from the Tea Party, refusing 
neither to fall victim to pathologizing their discourse nor to neglect to provide an engaging 
critique of it.  Instead, I place my scholarship somewhere in the middle. Approaching populism 
in this way, I provided several examples of social groups and political leaders utilizing populist 
rhetoric to construct particular narratives about the role of communication technology.  Whether 
it was the Populist Party in the 1890s circulating alternative newspapers, Father Charles 
Coughlin in the 1930s broadcasting sermons on the radio, Ross Perot taking advantage of cable 
news channels to campaign for the presidency, or Tea Party sympathizer Sarah Palin rebuking 
the mainstream media—in each case populist rhetorical frameworks inform the relationship 
between social groups and technology.  Social groups and individual politicians using populism 
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as a linguistic mode of persuasion consequently construct a narrative about communication 
technology as inherently democratic, revolutionary, and an integral part of American society. 
Next, I provided a brief history of the Tea Party movement, in which I described it as a 
loose confederation of bloggers and social activists reacting against the Obama administration‘s 
healthcare reform acts and stimulus packages of 2009.  Critiques of the Tea Party as a faux 
grassroots, or ―Astro-Turf‖ movement, with millions of dollars being funneled in from corporate 
interests to create the illusion of a bottom-up movement, while not necessarily unwarranted, are 
not fully correct either.  Grassroots activism is a huge component of the Tea Party—most 
recognizable in their new media presence on both the local and national levels.  The tension 
between Tea Party activists who wish to remain decentralized, grassroots, ideologically-centered, 
and those who align the Tea Party with political candidates, highlights the complexity and 
variation within the Tea Party.  This is not to say that the Tea Party is completely free from 
corporate ties, though.  Politicians and other organizations like FreedomWorks, for instance, co-
opted Tea Party rhetoric to capitalize on the growing media coverage to pursue their own 
political interests.  These tensions reveal a nascent movement still competing for power, 
attempting to articulate its place both at the local and national level, and also attempting to 
establish a coherent social identity.  Ultimately I argue that one component of these struggles is a 
close relationship with new media.  Through a look at the history and digital rhetoric of Tea 
Party Patriots, FreedomWorks, and Tea Party Express, I explore some of the populist rhetorical 
patterns from chapter 1 to show a close relationship with populist rhetoric and technological 
determinism, or rather, assertions that technology is a liberating weapon of democracy, freedom, 
liberty, etc.  The Tea Party‘s use of new media, like populist rhetoric in general, promotes 
democracy and freedom while simultaneously restricting access to others.   
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In light of the Tea Party‘s new media communication strategies which are linked closely 
to a history of populist rhetoric, the last chapter was a reflection on the data to see how the Tea 
Party‘s engagement with new media fit into broader conversations about the relationship 
between technology and democracy.  Is new media actually democratic?  Using a theoretical 
model of what many call a successful democracy, the public sphere, I analyzed how the Tea 
Party‘s digital rhetoric fit into this conversation.  Beginning with Habermas‘s vision of a public 
sphere, rearticulated through notions of counter-publics, multiple publics, and other redefinitions 
of the public sphere, we see that the role of technology in creating and sustaining democracy is 
complicated, and far from democratizing information and freeing otherwise stifled voices.  New 
media technology, I argue, can also be just as fragmentary and exclusory.  Tea Party website 
FAQ sections that restrict access to non-English speakers, or digital training seminars for Tea 
Party members that teach ―digital activism‖ tactics that encourage the suppression of dissenting 
views—reveal a relationship with technology that contradicts the prevailing rhetoric implicit and 
explicit throughout the movement.  Moreover, the way the Tea Party uses technology reveals less 
of a more informed civic engagement process, and more of a complex relationship with 
technology that stifles just as many voices as it illuminates.  Ironically, this is characteristic of 
populism in general, which makes the entire relationship between populism, technology, and 
democracy even more dynamic, complex, unstable, yet fundamentally interrelated, than we may 
have previously thought. 
 However, the Tea Party is just as much entangled with race as it is with technology.  It 
would be foolish to assume that rhetoric of populism and the way it informs societal 
relationships with technology can be disassociated with racial histories as well.  Carolyn de la 
Pena writes that technology isn‘t just some tool used by a monolithic group called ―Americans.‖  
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On the contrary, ―racial, ethnic, gender, and class differences play a dramatic role in who gets to 
create technologies and to what ends those technologies are used.‖
1
  Moreover, Joel Dinerstein 
writes that technology itself in America is a white mythology, part of a ―Western tendency to 
universalize its own concepts,‖ reflecting tired equations of technological progress with western 
superiority.‖
2
 Perhaps future research on the intersections of populist rhetoric, technology, and 
society, would benefit from a more thorough consideration of race in this process.  While I 
touched on several of the racial currents and criticisms of the Tea Party, and others elsewhere 
have noted how closely linked the Tea Party is to issues of performative whiteness and racism 
typical of right-wing reactionary movements-past, the field of research that explores intersections 
of race, rhetoric, new media, and political movements, is still relatively small and understudied.
3
   
In this project, my aim was to link populist rhetoric with technological determinism, 
using the Tea Party as a case study.  By providing historical examples of populist rhetoric and 
understandings of technology, a case study of three Tea Party websites, and an investigation into 
new media‘s democratic potentials, I argue that the Tea Party is a distinct site where issues of 
populism, technology, and democracy are being performed, understood, and contested, 
constructing a particular narrative about the role of technology in society. Future analyses may 
benefit from a study of technological rhetoric similar to Michael Adas‘s Machines as the 
Measure of Man.  Through historical and rhetorical accounts, Adas traces how the West became 
a colonial power through technological narratives of cultural dominance, racial superiority and 
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 Carolyn de la Pena, ―Slow and Low Progress, or Why American Studies Should Do Technology, American 
Quarterly 58. No 6 (2006), 921. 
2
 Joel Dinerstein, ―Technology and Its Discontents:  On the Verge of the Posthuman,‖ American Quarterly 58. No 6 
(2006), 592. 
3
 Scholars like Adam Banks, Ben Chappell, Joel Dinerstein and others are emerging writers in a wave Pena calls the 
―third wave of technology studies,‖ but Pena also notes that more are needed in the quest to better understand how 
technology works in our everyday lives using a more interdisciplinary scope that incorporates notions of difference, 
power, dominance, and race. 
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technological ―progress.‖
4
  Subsequent projects should explore how similar theories of race 
complicate the relationship between rhetoric of social movements like the Tea Party and new 
media engagement. 
Also, populism is a very convenient mode of persuasion for understanding technology‘s 
role in society, and may explain America‘s propensity to construct technology as a pivotal and 
essential tool for modernization, democracy, freedom, and American culture in general.  For the 
Tea Party is not the only group that understands technology in this way; the movement is merely 
a valuable case study of how populist rhetoric informs technological narratives.  Michael Lee 
even goes as far to assert that there is a ―populist paradox‖ in America, precipitated by the very 
founding of the United States.  The founding documents of the American republic itself invoke a 
populist argumentative frame envisioning a singular people ―as the sole beams of democratic 
light in a world darkened by greed and corruption.‖  In other words, the utility of populist 
rhetoric is central to the origins of American political thought entirely, which yields obvious 
problems: ―In attempting to empower the ―people,‖ populism often disempowers specific groups 
of people.‖  Asserting that populism represents the best and the worst of the nation‘s political 
languages, the ―populist paradox‖ also means populism is likely here to stay.
5
 
Can American society, then, relate to technology without attaching to strains of populist 
rhetoric that depict it as a benevolent, progressive project of democracy? Perhaps.  But as we 
look at television commercials that show cell-phones as an essential tool capable of 
revolutionizing and democratizing society, or when we are confronted with rhetoric about the 
Internet that assumes democracy cannot be obtained without online social networking freedoms 
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like Twitter or Facebook—I argue that we should temper these images with reflections on the 
limits of technology.  The relationship between technology and society can benefit from the 
consideration of how money, power, racism, access, and historical forces limit the reaches of 
―progress‖ and consequently shape our narratives about the implications of technology. 
In 2006 Carolyn de la Pena wrote that American Studies practitioners should look to 
include technology studies into their scholarship, particularly due to the lack of a sufficient 
critique of technology ―as both substance and ideology in American cultural life.‖
6
 The gap, she 
writes, is usually left to others, while technology has seldom been studied through lenses of 
fundamental issues within the field of American Studies: diversity, equity, social justice, etc.  
Pena argues to include technology studies within the methodologies of American Studies, 
because of the tendency of American Studies to ―make broad leaps,‖ fashioning interdisciplinary 
connections that would better illuminate ―Americans‘ complex relationships with technology.‖
7
 
Leo Marx‘s Machine in the Garden was one of the early and pivotal American Studies 
approaches to technology, tracing the tension between two symbolic modes of thought in 
American culture: pastoralism and notions of technological ―progress.‖ The cold, individualistic 
―machine‖ of industrial society supplants itself onto the simpler, purer landscape of the 
American garden, Marx writes, representing the quintessential dilemma in 20
th
 century American 
culture: the stark contrast between these two separate, seemingly opposed conditions of 
consciousness.  Machine in the Garden traces the impact of the symbolic power of the 
implantation of the machine onto the pastoral ideal through the works of various intellectuals and 
novelists throughout the 19
th
 century. The inability to create an ―ideal middle landscape‖ of 
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reconciliation between the ―natural‖ vitality of a green, idyllic pasture, and the inexorable, 
mechanic train of history is, according to Marx, the root conflict in American history.
8
  Marx 
understands pastoralism as a particular mythology ―perpetuated by those who pursued 
technological ‗progress.‖‘
9
  
Since Marx, technology studies has gone through several ―waves,‖ as Pena writes, 
including pushing the concept further, from thinking about technology not just as a material 
consequence or as a narrative concept, but focusing also on how technology is an everyday 
experience.  The current ―wave,‖ addresses technology with regard to questions of difference and 
power, or rather, rearticulating definitions of technological progress, focusing on the ―ways in 
which technology enables diverse expression and enhances human experiences.‖
10
  I envision my 
scholarship connected to the technological investigations predicated by Marx, and contributing to 
the current conversation, incorporating the cross-sections of rhetoric, new media, and politics to 
challenge and rearticulate conventional assumptions about technology and progress.  Pena writes 
that more interdisciplinary projects in the field of technology studies will help us ―better 
understand how technological assumptions guide the production of all knowledge.‖   
My project, in addressing rhetorical modes of persuasion that inform social groups‘ 
relationship with technological narratives, adds to the conversation in a new and meaningful 
way, and suggests avenues of new research within the field of American Studies and technology 
studies, that incorporates rhetoric of technology with regard to social movements.  In 
highlighting the new media practices of the Tea Party, my project is not a linear history of 
technological rhetoric, but an interdisciplinary investigation that challenges norms and 
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assumptions about the role of technology in our everyday lives, suggesting new ways to look at 
populism, technology, and democracy.  In subsequent works I hope to expand this mode of 
thinking, to heed Pena‘s call for a richer field of American Studies, to ―transcend linear 
narratives of technological history‖ to eventually ―master the steps of our long-running dance 
with the machine.‖
11
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